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Abstract: Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a method for reducing or eliminating 
failure modes in a system. A failure mode occurs when a system does not meet its specification. 
While FMEA is widely used in different industries, its multiple limitations can cause the method 
to be ineffective. One major limitation is the ambiguity of the risk priority number (RPN), which 
is used for risk prioritization and is the product of three ordinal variables: severity of effect, 
probability of occurrence, and likelihood of detection. There have been multiple attempts to 
address the RPN’s ambiguity, but more work is still needed. Any new risk prioritization method 
needs to have a decision-support system to determine when to implement a corrective action or 
improvement. 
This research addresses some of the shortcomings of traditional FMEA through the creation of a 
new method called Economic Impact FMEA (EI-FMEA). EI-FMEA replaces the three ordinal 
values used in the RPN calculation with a new set of variables focusing on the expected cost of a 
failure occurring. A detailed decision-support system allows for the evaluation of corrective 
actions based on implementation cost, recurring cost, and adjusted failure cost. The RPN risk 
prioritization metric is replaced by the economic impact value (EIV) risk prioritization metric 
which ranks risks based on the impact of the corrective action through the largest reduction in 
potential failure cost. To help with resource allocation, the EIV only ranks risks where the 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research topic, motivation for choosing the topic, the research 
significance, and the research problem and purpose statements. This chapter concludes with the 
research questions that will guide the research methodology. 
1.1  Research Thrust 
The major thrust of this research is the improvement of quality through the reduction of failure 
cost in a manufacturing environment. Quality is a product’s ability to meet its specification and 
be free of deficiencies (Juran & Godfrey, 1999), which create non-value-added cost in a product. 
These non-value costs are the costs associated with finding, repairing, or reworking failures. To 
be competitive in the marketplace, a company needs to improve quality by minimizing failure 
cost (Saleem, Nisar, Khan, Khan, & Sheikh, 2017). This research will investigate ways to reduce 
failure cost using failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). 
1.2 Motivation and Significance 
Today’s companies face global competition in three primary areas: faster product development, 
reduction of costs, and high customer expectations for a quality product (Carlson, 2012). A 
company with long production development times, high costs, and low quality will not survive in 
the competitive environment. FMEA is a failure-prevention method that, when used correctly, 
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addresses all three areas, but certain limitations to the traditional FMEA can make the method 
ineffective (Jiang, Xie, Wei, & Zhou, 2016). Further development of the FMEA method is needed 
to address the limitations and create an effective process. 
1.3 Problem Identification 
Manufacturing companies are looking for ways to manufacture high-quality products to be 
competitive in a global marketplace (Saleem et al., 2017). A high-quality product is a product that 
meets its specifications, provides customer satisfaction, and is free from deficiencies in the 
manufacturing process (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). New product designs and existing products 
benefit from failure-prevention methods that enhance quality, particularly through cost-effective 
prevention methods (Bohan & Horney, 1991; Cheah, Shahbudin, & Taib, 2011; Feiring, Sasfri, & 
Mak, 1998). FMEA is a common prevention method, but it has inherent limitations. A review of 
75 different studies lists multiple instances of ambiguity in the risk priority number (RPN) risk 
prioritization metric and the input variables (i.e., severity of effects (S), probability of occurrence 
(O), and likelihood of detection (D), referred to as the SOD variables in this research ) that make 
up the RPN as a major limitation to the FMEA method (H.-C. Liu, Liu, & Liu, 2013).  
 
Table 1-1. Common Themes in RPN Value Ambiguity  
Ambiguity of RPN value 
Number of 
Studies 
Relative importance among SOD variables is not taken into consideration 45 
Different combinations of SOD variables produce the same RPN value, but 
risk may be different 
33 
SOD variables are subjective and difficult to determine 21 
RPN multiplication is an incorrect mathematical operation 14 
RPN value cannot be used to measure the effectiveness of corrective 
actions 
12 
Large gaps in RPN values make it difficult to determine the impact of 
corrective actions due to holes in the RPN achievable scale 
10 
Note. Adapted from H.-C. Liu et al. (2013). 
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1.3.1 Problem Statement 
Failure mode and effects analysis is a method for reducing or eliminating failure modes in a 
system. A failure mode occurs when a system does not meet its specification. FMEA uses the 
RPN to prioritize the allocation of available resources to failure modes (Guo, Li, & Wolf, 2016). 
The ambiguity of the RPN risk prioritization metric in FMEA, however, produces inconsistent 
risk prioritization (L.-Y. Chen & Yeh, 2014; Gargama & Chaturvedi, 2011; Kmenta & Ishii, 
2005). The cost associated to improve the system quality (i.e., system meeting the specification) 
can be between 20%–50% of sales, thus reducing a company’s ability to be competitive in the 
marketplace (Dahlgaard & Dahlgaard, 2002; Gupta & Campbell, 1995; Sandoval-Chávez & 
Beruvides, 1998). Any new risk prioritization method needs to have a decision-support system to 
determine when to implement a corrective action (CA) or improvement (H.-C. Liu, You, Li, & 
Su, 2016). 
1.4 Research Purpose 
Since 1992, there has been an exponential growth in FMEA studies that use an alternative method 
to the RPN value for risk prioritization (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). The growth in studies is also 
significant over the past 10 years with 40 studies between 2007 and 2011 and hundreds of studies 
between 2012 and 2016 (Figure 1-1).  
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Figure 1-1. FMEA studies by timeframe.  
Note. Adapted from H.-C. Liu et al. (2013). 
 
The three most popular methods for addressing the ambiguity of the RPN metric are fuzzy-based 
studies, grey theory, and cost-based analysis (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). Fuzzy-based studies and 
grey theory use weighting factors and membership functions with linguistic SOD variables that 
do not address the underlying weakness of the RPN metric. Cost-based studies replace the SOD 
variables with two ratio scales for probability of failure and cost of failure to address the 
ambiguity of the RPN prioritization metric (Kmenta & Ishii, 2005; Rhee, 2005), but the studies 
do not define economic factors for corrective action or resource allocation and are limited in their 
risk ranking.  
1.4.1   Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this research is to develop an economic-impact-based failure mode and effects 
analysis that uses an economic-risk-prioritization metric to prioritize risk and determine resource 
allocation in a manufacturing environment.  
1.4.2 Research Questions 
During the research, I evaluate two main research questions. 
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1. How can risk be prioritized to reduce failure cost? 
2. How are finite resources allocated to reduce failure cost? 
1.5 Summary 
Companies face competition on a global scale and need to have products with high quality and 
low non-valued added costs. FMEA is a dependability analysis method used to help identify 
potential failure modes in a product, but inherent limitations to the method can cause the process 
to be ineffective. The following research investigates ways to address certain limitations to the 
traditional FMEA process to make it more effective. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
2. Background of the Study 
This chapter analyzes the body of knowledge pertaining to failure mode and effects analysis, 
starting with an introduction to the cost of quality (CoQ) and explaining how FMEA fits within 
the concept. An introduction to FMEA follows, which includes a brief history, the use of FMEA, 
and how to perform an FMEA. Next, the limitations of FMEA are discussed, followed by an 
evaluation of prior studies and their attempt to address the limitations. This chapter concludes 
with the current state of the problem and support for further research.  
2.1 Cost of Quality 
The cost of poor quality is a term coined by Joseph Juran in the early 1950s in his Quality 
Control Handbook. Juran defines the cost of poor quality as the costs associated with finding and 
fixing products that do not meet their intended purpose or specification (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). 
The CoQ includes costs associated with preventing failures and is the total cost to produce a 
product which meets the specification (Bohan & Horney, 1991). It is a collection of four cost 
categories: prevention, appraisal, internal failure, and external failure. Gupta and Campbell 
(1995) describe the four categories as follows: prevention costs are the costs associated with 
building quality into a product; appraisal costs are the costs associated with making certain a 
product meets the specification or requirements; internal failure costs are the costs associated 
with a product not meeting its specification, as found by the manufacturer; and external failure
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costs are the costs associated with a product not meeting its specification, as found by the 
customer. 
 
Equation 2-1: Cost of quality 
𝐶𝑜𝑄 = 𝑃 + 𝐴 + 𝐼𝐹 + 𝐸𝐹 
where P = Prevention costs, A = Appraisal costs, IF = Internal failure costs, and EF = 
External failure costs.  
 
2.1.1 Types of Costs 
There are two groups of costs in the CoQ: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary costs are the 
proactive costs paid to reduce or prevent failure, and involuntary costs are the reactive costs paid 
to fix failure. Prevention costs and appraisal costs are voluntary while internal and external failure 
costs are involuntary (Sandoval-Chávez & Beruvides, 1998). Prevention costs are funds invested 
to reduce the amount of failures, or non-conformances, in a product, often through quality 
planning, process planning and control, dependability analysis, and training (Juran & Godfrey, 
1999). Dependability analyses are specific tools for identifying and reducing failures. These tools 
include fault tree analysis, reliability block analysis, petri net analysis, Markov analysis, and 
FMEA.  
Appraisal costs can determine if a product conforms to its specification by using incoming 
inspection and test, in situ inspection and test, final inspection and test, document review, and 
product quality audits (Juran & Godfrey, 1999).  
Internal failure costs occur when an item is found to be non-conforming to its specification(s) 
before it leaves the manufacturing plant. These costs, which can increase quickly, may include 
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scrap, rework, repair, failure analysis, and lost or missing information (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). 
The costs associated with failure can include the dollar amount of the product being scrapped or 
reworked, the time to determine the root cause of the failure, the costs to implement a change, 
extra in situ testing or inspection, the lost time cost associated with downtime, or potential costs 
for missing delivery dates. Lost or missing information costs are the costs associated with 
collecting information which should have been supplied with the product. For example, an 
operator uses the weight of a wind-turbine blade to match a set of blades for a given wind-turbine 
system, but the weight data are not collected in the factory operating system. The operator then 
must spend time tracking down the weight data from a previous weight operation and is not 
currently adding value to the wind-turbine system. None of these internal failure costs would 
exist if a product conforms to its specification at the time of production and has no deficiencies 
(Juran & Godfrey, 1999).  
External failure cost occurs when an item is found to be non-conforming to its specification after 
it leaves the manufacturing plant and the customer has received it. These costs can include 
warranty charges, returns, product recalls, complaint investigations, allowances or discounts 
made to a customer, poor-quality penalty fees, lost opportunities in sales, lawsuits, and lost 
perceptions of quality (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). External failures are the most expensive cost 
category in CoQ calculations. Once a product leaves the manufacturing facility, the cost 
associated with a non-conformance or deficiency is significantly higher than if the issue is found 
at the manufacturer (Gupta & Campbell, 1995). Portions of external costs are easy to quantify 
(e.g., warranty charges, complaint investigations, allowances, and poor-quality fees); however, 
lost opportunities in sales and lost perception of quality are not easy to quantify. It is hard for a 
company to know the exact cost of a non-conforming product reaching the market place.  
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2.1.2 External Failure Cost Effects 
In September 2015, investigators found Volkswagen modified their engine-control software to 
give a false positive reading on their diesel engine vehicles during emissions testing. The 
modification allows the vehicle to pass the emissions test and revert to the standard software 
during normal use, which puts out emissions higher than allowable. The software modification is 
found on approximately 11 million vehicles built over a period of 8 years (Atiyeh, 2017). The 
backlash against Volkswagen has been swift and fierce. Two weeks after the violation became 
public, the stock price decreased by over 40%. Volkswagen currently has multiple pending class 
action lawsuits, some from different governments. In the fall of 2016, Volkswagen came to a 
settlement with the United States Department of Justice for approximately $15 billion dollars 
(Bomey, 2016). There are still several multibillion dollar lawsuits pending. Even though the issue 
exists on the diesel-engine vehicles, the whole company has been affected. The settled and 
pending lawsuits are well into the multiple billions of dollars, but the lawsuits are the costs that 
can easily be seen. Volkswagen may never know the total monetary impact from loss of 
consumer confidence. This is an example where external failure costs often carry significant 
monetary impact that is difficult to fully encompass. 
2.1.3 Cost of Quality Importance 
The typical CoQ for a company ranges between 10%–50% of total sales (Dahlgaard & 
Dahlgaard, 2002; Gupta & Campbell, 1995; Juran & Godfrey, 1999; Sandoval-Chávez & 
Beruvides, 1998). The goal of a company should be to reduce the CoQ to a minimum. A low 
single percentage of the CoQ to total sales is ideal, yet only 40% of companies keep track of their 
quality costs (Gupta & Campbell, 1995). It costs less for a company to build a higher-quality 
product compared to fixing the problems associated with a lower-quality product (Bohan & 
Horney, 1991; Morse, 1993). Quality cannot be increased through inspection or appraisal 
methods. Often, a company may increase spending in appraisal methods which in turn reduces 
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external failures but raises internal failures (Gupta & Campbell, 1995). The most cost-effective 
quality spending is in prevention, which can reduce failures exponentially (Cheah et al., 2011; 
Feiring et al., 1998). There is a “Rule of 10” in the CoQ stating that $1 in prevention cost reduces 
internal failure costs by $10 and external failure costs by $100 (Bohan & Horney, 1991). 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Rule of 10 quality costs. 
 
A focus on prevention and investment in prevention techniques (e.g., FMEA) is needed to reduce 
failure. Reduced failure leads to decreased quality spending, which in turn increases profits and 
makes a company more competitive in the market place (Visawan & Tannock, 2004). When there 
is no product failure, internal costs and external costs are nonexistent (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). 
2.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMEA uses dependability analyses to identify failure modes, determine the effect of the failure 
modes, and rank the failure modes based on their effects. The ranking of the failure modes is used 
to show increasing risk. FMEA’s goal is to improve reliability through corrective actions that 
decrease failure rate and its associated risk (Cassanelli, Mura, Fantini, Vanzi, & Plano, 2006). 
• Prevention$1 
• Internal Failure$10
• External 
Failure$100
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2.2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis History 
The United Stated military created FMEA in the 1940s with the release of MIL-STD-1629, due in 
part to the large number of quality issues during World War II (United States Department of 
Defense, 1980). During the 1960s, NASA began to use FMEA to help reduce the number of 
failures in their Apollo rocket programs (H.-C. Liu et al., 2016). By the 1970s, the automotive 
industry started to use FMEA and helped to define the severity of effect, probability of 
occurrence, and likelihood of detection variables. The SOD variables are three ordinal numbers 
that are multiplied together to create the RPN (Hassan, Siadat, Dantan, & Martin, 2010). FMEA 
continued to evolve, and two distinct methods were created—design failure mode and effects 
analysis and process failure mode and effects analysis (Teng & Ho, 1996). Today, FMEA can be 
used in almost any industry (e.g., military, aerospace, automotive, medical, electronics, software, 
etc.) and is often tailored for the industry in which it is used (Carlson, 2012).  
2.2.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Use 
An FMEA is used to “design out” future problems and to reduce and eliminate major problems 
(United States Department of Defense, 1980) on, for example, a process, product, software, or 
design. For the purposes of this paper, the term product will be used to define the multiple 
categories on which an FMEA can be performed. A wide variety of industries use FMEA (see 
Table 2-1), and researchers are adapting it for areas outside of traditional manufacturing including 
patient safety in healthcare (Sujan, Habli, Kelly, Pozzi, & Johnson, 2016), surgical training 
(Mesa, Hurtado, Margallo, Cabeza de Vaca, & Komorowski, 2015), transportation logistics 
(Stavrou & Ventikos, 2016), knowledge management (Luo & Lee, 2015), and environmental risk 
on wildlife habitats (Dargahi et al., 2016).  
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Table 2-1. Industries that use FMEA 
Industry Author 
Aerospace Freeman and Balas (2014); Guo et al. (2016); Jiang et al. (2016); Lillie, 
Sandborn, and Humphrey (2015) 
Automotive Aldridge, Taylor, and Dale (1991); Automotive Industry Action Group 
(2008); SAE International (2009); Whiteley, Dunnett, and Jackson (2016); 
Xu, Tang, Xie, Ho, and Zhu (2002) 
Electronics L.-Y. Chen and Yeh (2014); Jee, Tay, and Lim (2015); S.-F. Liu, Cheng, Lee, 
and Gau (2016) 
Healthcare S.-H. Chen (2016); Dağsuyu, Göçmen, Narlı, and Kokangül (2016); H.-C. 
Liu et al. (2016) 
Manufacturing Lolli, Gamberini, Rimini, and Pulga (2016); Pancholi and Bhatt (2016); 
Pandian (2010); Pradhan and Routroy (2014); Saleem et al. (2017); Sastri, 
Mongkolwana, and Feiring (2001) 
Maritime Akyuz, Akgun, and Celik (2016); Emovon, Norman, Murphy, and Pazouki 
(2015); Mentes and Ozen (2015); Pillay and Wang (2003); Zaman et al. 
(2014); Zhou and Thai (2016) 
Military Roy, Sarkar, and Mahanty (2016); United States Department of Defense 
(1980) 
Power Plant Bevilacqua, Braglia, and Gabbrielli (2000); Das Adhikary, Bose, Bose, and 
Mitra (2014) 
Processing Mariajayaprakash, Senthilvelan, and Gnanadass (2015); Pancholi and Bhatt 
(2016); Rezaee, Salimi, and Yousefi (2017) 
Solar Cell Colli (2015); Kuitche, Pan, and TamizhMani (2014) 
Software Goddard (2000); Park, Kim, and Lee (2014); Steinke, Kurniawati, and 
Nindel-Edwards (2010) 
Transportation Boufaied, Thabet, and Korbaa (2016); Zhu, Li, Xiao, and Xu (2015) 
Wind 
Turbines 
Arabian-Hoseynabadi, Oraee, and Tavner (2010); Fischer, Besnard, and Lina 
(2012); Shafiee and Dinmohammadi (2014) 
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2.2.3 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Type 
Over the years, there have been multiple versions of FMEAs introduced, with the two most 
common being design failure mode and effects analysis (DFMEA) and process failure mode and 
effects analysis (PFMEA). A DFMEA focuses on the design of a product; it is often used during 
the initial design of a product but can also be used at later stages of the life cycle when a user is 
looking for deficiencies in the design. A PFMEA focuses on the processing and manufacturing of 
a product and will look for deficiencies in the manufacturing process as well as for variability in 
the product components (Carlson, 2012). Table 2-2 lists additional types of FMEAs, their uses, 
and in what stage of the product life cycle they should be used. 
 
Table 2-2. Types of FMEA  
Type of FMEA Uses When to use 
Concept FMEA 
To evaluate concept alternatives prior 
to design activities 
Conception/early life cycle 
Design FMEA 
At a subsystem or component level, 
to develop a design or when plan a 
major design change 
Throughout life cycle 
Failure modes, effects and 
criticality analysis 
(FMECA) 
To add a detailed criticality analysis 
to an FMEA 
Throughout life cycle 
Maintenance FMEA 
To determine maintenance 
approaches when the process/design 
is mature enough 
After initial design/process 
developed 
Process FMEA 
To develop a new manufacturing 
process, to evaluate a major change 
in the process, when new technology 
becomes available 
After initial design and 
throughout later life cycle 
Software FMEA 
Whenever the user determines there 
are risks to the software being 
utilized 
After initial design 
System FMEA 
To develop a new system or plan a 
major change  
Throughout life cycle 
Note. Adapted from Carlson (2012). 
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The type of FMEA used is determined by the team executing it. Customers can require the 
frequency of the FMEA, but the producer benefits from performing an FMEA multiple times 
through the life cycle of a product to reduce deficiencies. 
2.2.4 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Procedure 
The first step in performing an FMEA is to establish a multidisciplinary team whose members 
represent different groups in an industry environment. For a particular industry, this can include 
design engineers, process engineers, mechanical engineers, systems engineers, quality engineers, 
program managers, front line technicians, supply chain, manufacturing engineers, electrical 
engineers, and subject-matter experts for the product being reviewed. The team should be chosen 
based on relevant experience.  
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Figure 2-2. FMEA flowchart.  
Note. Adapted from Rezaee et al. (2017). 
 
The team begins by creating a preliminary risk assessment to determine areas of concern for the 
product. This helps identify where the team should focus their resources first. Once the team 
chooses an area of interest, they often perform block diagram(s). The block diagram is a visual 
map allowing the team to see interactions in a system that may be missed when only looking at 
the FMEA in spreadsheet format (e.g., Figure 2-3). With the block diagram complete, the team 
can now begin the FMEA process through population of the spreadsheet. The FMEA spreadsheet 
can be tailored for the industry, product, or system being evaluated. The order of the columns 
may change, but the categories are traditionally present. 
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Figure 2-3. Traditional FMEA spreadsheet example. 
 
An FMEA normally uses a bottom-up approach (i.e., inductive) to look at individual components 
and at how failures at the component level can affect later subsystems and systems. At times, a 
team may use a top-down approach early in the life cycle when individual components are not 
fully defined. The FMEA spreadsheet helps organize an FMEA team’s thoughts and provides a 
template for RPN calculations and priority ranking. The spreadsheet typically includes the 
following categories: item number, item/function, potential failure mode, potential effects of 
failure, potential cause/mechanism of failure, current controls/prevention, severity ranking, 
occurrence ranking, detection ranking, RPN, priority, recommended action, and owner of the 
action. Some FMEA spreadsheets also include columns for the implementation of a corrective 
action. These additional columns are labeled with the following: action taken, severity ranking, 
occurrence ranking, detection ranking, and new RPN.  
FMEAs can be performed in different orders depending on team preference but are typically done 
by moving from row to row. The team begins by selecting an item to review. The user lists the 
item to be analyzed on the spreadsheet in the Item/Function column. The team then begins to 
brainstorm failure modes for that item and to list them in the Potential Failure Modes column. 
There can be multiple failure modes for an item being reviewed, and each failure mode should 
have its own row on the spreadsheet. The failure modes show how the product or system is 
 17 
 
deficient to its intended function as defined by the Item/Function column. Under Potential Effects 
of Failure, the FMEA team will list how the failure mode affects the function (e.g., decreased 
performance, customer dissatisfaction, etc.). The next step is to determine the potential cause or 
mechanism of failure. There can be multiple potential causes for a single failure mode, and each 
should be listed on its own row. Then, for each row of the spreadsheet, the team lists existing 
controls to detect or prevent the potential causes in the Controls Prevention column. The Severity, 
Occurrence, and Detection columns are the ordinal ranking factors used to measure the effect of 
failure. As discussed above, the SOD variables are subjective, the rankings for the SOD variables 
can be tailored, and ranking scales can be established by the team. Most times values are within 1 
to 10, but some teams may use a scale of 1 to 5. Either scale can work, but the scales need to be 
the same for each variable to keep equal weighting. The SOD variables are independent of each 
other, with equal weighting. An uneven scale would give one of the variables a higher weighted 
value. 
The severity of effect is a subjective measurement used to determine the severity of the failure 
effect. The ranking and severity effect definition is often tailored to the specific FMEA being 
performed, using linguistic terms. This allows the FMEA team to rank unique effects for the 
specific application. Table 2-3 shows an example of a severity-factor guideline with rankings. 
Severity is ranked from 1 to 10, with 10 being the most severe. 
 
 18 
 
Table 2-3. Severity Factor Guideline 
Severity of effect 
Severity 
ranking 
Product, end user, or plant safety at risk; risk of noncompliance to 
government regulations 
10 
Major impact on ability to produce quality product 
on time; includes significant interference with 
subsequent steps or damage to equipment; could 
result in mission failure 
9 
Product defect, rejection, failure in in-spec storage/operational environments; 
disruption to subsequent process steps 
7–8 
End-user dissatisfaction, some degradation in performance, loss of margin, or 
delays in the process 
4–6 
Slight end-user annoyance, slight deterioration in performance or margin, 
minor rework action, or in-line delays 
2–3 
Little to no effect on product or subsequent steps 1 
Note. Adapted from Childs, Raheja, and Gullo (2012). 
 
The occurrence factor is the probability of the failure mode occurring during the life cycle or 
being present during a process (Carlson, 2012). The rate at which the failure mode occurs is 
tailored to the FMEA being performed. Table 2-4 shows an example of an occurrence factor 
guideline. The occurrence is ranked from 1 to 10 with 10 being the most frequent occurrence. 
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Table 2-4. Occurrence Factor Guideline 
Failure occurrence 
Probability of failure Occurrence 
ranking Defect rate Sigma 
Failure is certain or almost 
inevitable 
1 in 2  10 
1 in 8  9 
Failure trend likely; process step 
not in statistical control or SPC not 
used; similar steps with known 
problems; little/no experience with 
new tool or step 
1 in 20  8 
1 in 40  7 
Possible failure trend; process in 
statistical control (CPK< 1.00); 
similar steps with occasional 
problems 
1 in 80  6 
1 in 400  5 
1 in 1,000 ~ +3σ 4 
Low likelihood of failure; step in 
statistical control (CPK> 1.00); 
similar steps with isolated 
occurrences 
1 in 4,000 ~ +3.5σ 3 
Very low likelihood of failure; in 
statistical control (CPK> 1.33); rare 
occurrences in similar steps 
1 in 20,000 ~ +4σ 2 
Remote; no failure in similar steps 
(CPK> 1.67) 
1 in 1,000,000 ~ +5σ 1 
Note. Adapted from Childs et al. (2012). 
 
The likelihood-of-detection factor is how well the current processes or appraisal methods can 
detect if the failure mode is present prior to delivery to the end user. Table 2-5 shows an example 
of a likelihood-of-detection guideline. The likelihood of detection is ranked from 1 to 10, with a 
10 denoting that current appraisal methods cannot detect a given failure mode. 
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Table 2-5. Detection Factor Guideline 
Likelihood of detection 
Detection 
ranking 
No means of detection; no process or equipment to find problem in 
time to affect outcome 
10 
Controls would probably not detect defect; operator to perform self-
inspection 
9 
Controls have poor chance of detecting defect; inspection alone to 
detect problem 
7–8 
Controls might detect defect; double inspection or inspection with 
equipment aids 
5–6 
Controls have good chance of detecting defect; process equipment 
detects presence of problem under most circumstances 
3–4 
Controls will almost certainly detect defect; process detects defects 
automatically 
1–2 
Note. Adapted from Childs et al. (2012). 
 
The RPN is a numerical ranking that is the product of the three values of severity of effect, failure 
occurrence, and likelihood of detection.  
 
Equation 2-2: Risk priority number. 
𝑅𝑃𝑁 =  𝑆 ∗ 𝑂 ∗ 𝐷 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑆 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘, 𝑂 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘. 
 
The RPN denotes which failure mode has the largest effect or risk to the product. The higher the 
RPN, the larger the effect/risk on the product. The RPN is a prioritization metric for determining 
which failure modes should be addressed and where resources should be allocated. Some FMEA 
teams rank the RPN in descending numerical order to establish priority where others may choose 
to address failure modes with an RPN above a certain value (e.g., address failure modes for RPNs 
greater than 150). Both are acceptable methods for ranking risk during an FMEA.  
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The next portion of the FMEA process is to address the failure modes identified during analysis. 
Teams brainstorm corrective actions and implementation plans for high-risk failure modes 
defined by a large RPN. In the Recommended Action column, the FMEA team can list a 
corrective action. Corrective actions are chosen for the ability to reduce the failure effect, denoted 
by RPN, on the product. In the Owner/Target column, actions are delegated to an individual or 
group responsible for addressing the failure mode. A target due date is also listed for an 
implementation action. The Action Taken column lists the corrective action implemented for the 
given failure mode. The post SOD variables and RPN columns are used with respect to the 
corrective action being implemented. After taking corrective action the FMEA team compares the 
new RPN with the original RPN to look for improvement in the failure mode. Improvement is 
indicated through a lowered RPN number (e.g., original RPN 300 to a new RPN of 150). Thus, 
teams want to minimize the RPN number. 
The FMEA is not complete after filling out the FMEA spreadsheet. The team also needs to 
monitor progress on implementation and evaluate if the changes improve the product. The FMEA 
process relies on participation, follow through, and execution by the entire team. 
2.2.5 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Limitations 
Failure mode and effects analysis has been in use since World War II. Since then, there have been 
improvements and variations in the process, as well as numerous documented limitations. H.-C. 
Liu et al. (2013) performed an in-depth literature review on alternative FMEA methods from 
1992 through 2012, focusing on peer-reviewed journal articles, and found 75 different studies. 
Throughout this time frame, they found the number of studies published increased in every 4-year 
period (Figure 2-4). Liu et al. hypothesized the trend would continue to increase as more users 
were looking for a practical method to improve the FMEA process. The researchers identified 40 
studies published between 2007 and 2011; now, a search for alternative FMEA methods yields 
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hundreds of studies from the past 5 years. The following sections provide a sampling of these 
methods and groups them into the major themes found in the literature. 
 
   
Figure 2-4. FMEA studies by year. 
Note. Adapted from H.-C. Liu et al. (2013). 
 
2.2.5.1 Time to Perform 
A full FMEA is a time-consuming process (Bluvband & Grabov, 2009; Carmignani, 2009; Goble, 
2012; Kmenta, 2001; Price & Taylor, 2002). This can create a challenge for the user to complete 
the process and can make the process cost prohibitive (Carmignani, 2009). Goble (2012) states, 
“solving the problem is not part of the analysis; the problems are solved once the analysis has 
been completed” (p. 20). There have been attempts to reduce the time to complete an FMEA. 
Price and Taylor (2002) created an automation process to reduce the amount of time to perform 
FMEA and to prioritize the results, reducing the time to evaluate the failure scenarios. Arabian-
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Hoseynabadi et al. (2010) evaluated commercially available software (i.e., Reliasoft Xfema, 
Reliability Workbench 10.1, and Reliability Studio 2007 V2) to reduce the time to perform an 
FMEA. Ebrahimipour, Rezaie, and Shokravi (2010) suggested the use of a database with common 
themes from previous studies that a team could reference during FMEA.  
2.2.5.2 When to Use Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 FMEA is commonly used too late in the life cycle to make an impact on a product (Aldridge et 
al., 1991; Kmenta, 2001; United States Department of Defense, 1980). An FMEA is an iterative 
process and should be used throughout the life cycle of a product (Cassanelli et al., 2006), but it is 
important to implement it as early in the design as possible (Kmenta, 2001; Teng & Ho, 1996; 
United States Department of Defense, 1980). As discussed earlier, quality can only be designed 
into a product and cannot be inspected in (Childs et al., 2012). Use of FMEA during the initial 
design allows future problems to be identified, reduced, or eliminated and significantly decreases 
the chances of major and catastrophic failures (United States Department of Defense, 1980). The 
design phase of a product accounts for most of the life-cycle cost. At the end of the design phase, 
75% of the life-cycle cost has been committed to the product while only 15% of the actual life-
cycle cost has been spent, as shown in Figure 2-5 (SAE International, 1992).  
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Figure 2-5. Life-cycle cost committed at different program phases.  
Note. Adapted from SAE International (1992). 
 
2.2.5.3 Ambiguity of the RPN 
One of the main arguments against FMEA is the ambiguity of the RPN (J. Bowles, 2004; 
Gargama & Chaturvedi, 2011; Kmenta & Ishii, 2005; H.-C. Liu et al., 2016; Lolli et al., 2016; 
Pillay & Wang, 2003; Ravi Sankar & Prabhu, 2001; Rhee, 2005). The RPN is made of the three 
ordinal values for severity of effect, probability of occurrence, and likelihood of detection. An 
ordinal value shows the rank, but the interval between values can vary (J. Bowles, 2004; Rhee & 
Ishii, 2003). Taking the product of an ordinal number results in losing the rank and performing an 
invalid mathematical transformation (J. Bowles, 2004; Kmenta, 2001; H.-C. Liu et al., 2016; 
Mentes & Ozen, 2015; Rhee & Ishii, 2003). The following sections provide more details on RPN 
ambiguity, including subjectivity of the SOD variables and criticism of the RPN values.  
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2.2.5.3.1 Subjectivity of the Severity, Occurrence, and Detection Variables 
The nature of the FMEA leads to subjectivity of the SOD variables. As shown in Table 2-1, many 
industries use FMEA, including the automotive, aerospace, healthcare, transportation, 
manufacturing, military, and process industries. Their FMEA teams create the SOD variable 
scales and rankings based on their industries. While certain scales may be usable in similar 
industries, the linguistic nature of the variables does not universally translate. 
The severity of effect is the measurement of the effect of a failure occurring. Table 2-6 shows 
severity-of-effects rankings for a generic industry, automotive industry, and blow mold 
manufacturing. As seen in the table, a severity ranking of 7 can have different meanings. Some 
users choose linguistic terms like those in the first column for measuring severity. These terms 
are highly subjective and may not reproduce the same values for different FMEA teams. 
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Table 2-6. Severity of Effects, by Industry 
Linguistic terms 
(from Automotive 
Industry Action 
Group (2008) 
Generic industry (from Childs et al. (2012) 
Automotive (from Automotive Industry Action 
Group (2008) 
Blow-mold 
manufacturing (from 
Lolli et al. (2016) 
Severity 
Hazardous without 
warning 
Product, end user, or plant safety at risk; risk 
of noncompliance to government regulations 
Very high severity ranking, when a potential failure 
mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves 
noncompliance with government regulation without 
warning 
Damage to customers 10 
Hazardous with 
warning 
Major impact on ability to produce quality 
product on time; includes significant 
interference with subsequent steps or damage 
to equipment; could result in mission failure 
Very high severity ranking, when a potential failure 
mode affects safe vehicle operation and/or involves 
noncompliance with government regulation with 
warning 
Damage to retailers 9 
Very high Product defect, rejection, failure in in-spec 
storage/operational environments; disruption to 
subsequent process steps 
 
Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary 
function. 
Very frequent line 
stops, leading to the 
blocking of production 
8 
High 
Vehicle/item operable but at reduced level of 
performance. Customer dissatisfied. 
Repeated line stops, 
leading to the blocking 
of production 
7 
Moderate 
End-user dissatisfaction, some degradation in 
performance, loss of margin, or delays in the 
process 
Vehicle/item operable, but comfort/convenience 
item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences 
discomfort. 
Very frequent line 
stops, leading to the 
product’s selection 
6 
Low 
Vehicle/item operable, but comfort/convenience 
item(s) operable at reduced level of performance. 
Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. 
Repeated line stops, 
leading to the product’s 
selection 
5 
Very low 
Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. 
Defect noticed by most customers. 
Periodic problems of 
machinability 
4 
Minor Slight end-user annoyance, slight deterioration 
in performance or margin, minor rework action 
or in-line delays 
 
Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. 
Defect noticed by average customer. 
Sporadic problems of 
machinability 
3 
Very minor 
Fit & finish/squeak & rattle item does not conform. 
Defect noticed by discriminating customer. 
Rare problems of 
machinability 
2 
None 
Little to no effect on product or subsequent 
steps 
No effect 
The line does not stop 
without damaging 
customers/retailers 
1 
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The probability of occurrence is the probability that the failure occurs. Table 2-7 shows the 
probability of occurrence for a generic industry, automotive industry, and marine industry. The 
probabilities for each industry vary, where a probability of occurrence of 1 in 20 could be a 7 or 
8, or 1 in 1,000 could be 4 or 5. Figure 2-6 is a plot on a logarithmic scale of the varying 
probabilities of occurrence. Later sections of this paper discuss how the rankings influence RPN 
calculations. 
 
  
Figure 2-6. Occurrence by industry scale. 
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Table 2-7. Probability of Occurrence, by Industry 
Linguistic terms (from 
Automotive Industry Action 
Group (2008) 
Generic industry (from 
Childs et al. (2012) 
Automotive (from 
Automotive Industry Action 
Group (2008) 
Marine (from Pillay and 
Wang (2003) 
Occurrence 
Very High: Failure is almost 
inevitable 
1 in 2 > 1 in 2 1 in 2 10 
1 in 8 1 in 3 1 in 10 9 
High: Repeated failures 
1 in 20 1 in 8 1 in 20 8 
1 in 40 1 in 20 1 in 100 7 
Moderate: Occasional failures 
1 in 80 1 in 80 1 in 200 6 
1 in 400 1 in 400 1 in 1,000 5 
1 in 1,000 1 in 2,000 1 in 2,000 4 
Low: Relatively few failures 
1 in 4,000 1 in 15,000 1 in 10,000 3 
1 in 20,000 1 in 150,000 1 in 20,000 2 
Remote: Failure is unlikely 1 in 1,000,000 < 1 in 1,500,000 < 1 in 20,000 1 
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The likelihood of detection is the measure of current process controls or tests being able to 
identify the failure prior to leaving the manufacturing facility. Table 2-8 shows the likelihood of 
detection for a generic industry, automotive industry, and blow-mold manufacturing. The 
linguistic variable for detection has been tailored for each industry and shows the subjectivity.
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Table 2-8. Likelihood of Detection, by Industry 
Linguistic terms 
(from 
Automotive 
Industry Action 
Group (2008) 
Generic industry (from Childs et al. 
(2012) 
Automotive (from Automotive Industry Action 
Group (2008) 
Blow-mold manufacturing 
(from Lolli et al. (2016) 
Detection 
Absolute 
Uncertainty 
No means of detection; no process or 
equipment to find problem in time to 
affect outcome 
Design control will not and/or cannot detect a 
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode; or there is no design control. 
No identifying test 10 
Very Remote 
Controls would probably not detect 
defect of failure; operator to perform 
self-inspection 
Very remote chance the design control will detect a 
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
A visual test exists, and a highly 
skilled technician can perform it 
using dedicated tools 
9 
Remote Controls have poor chance of detecting 
defect; inspection alone to detect 
problem 
 
Remote chance the design control will detect a 
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
A visual test exists, and an 
expert, highly skilled technician 
can perform it 
8 
Very Low 
Very low chance the design control will detect a 
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
A visual test exists, and a fairly 
skilled operator can perform it 
using dedicated tools 
7 
Low 
Controls might detect defect; double 
inspection or inspection with equipment 
aids 
Low chance the design control will detect a potential 
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode 
A visual test exists, and a fairly 
skilled operator can perform it 
6 
Moderate 
Moderate chance the design control will detect a 
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
A visual test exists, and it’s easy 
to identify the failure using 
dedicated tools 
5 
Moderately High Controls have good chance of detecting 
defect; process equipment detects 
presence of problem under most 
circumstances 
Moderately high chance the design control will detect 
a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
A visual test exists, and it’s easy 
to identify the failure 
4 
High 
High chance the design control will detect a potential 
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode 
A visual test exists, and the 
failure is immediately found 
using dedicated tools 
3 
Very High Control will almost certainly detect 
defect; process detects defects 
automatically 
Very high chance the design control will detect a 
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure 
mode 
A visual test exists, and the 
failure is immediately found 
2 
Almost Certain 
Design control will almost certainly detect a potential 
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode 
Automatic test 1 
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2.2.5.3.2 Risk Priority Number Criticism 
Multiplying the three SOD variables produces the RPN as well as large gaps in the RPN values. 
The SOD rankings are from 1 to 10, making the lowest RPN value equal to 1 (i.e., 1*1*1=1) and 
the highest RPN value equal to 1,000 (i.e., 10*10*10=1,000). Many of the numbers in the 1 to 
1,000 scale are not achievable. There are only 120 individual RPN values that can occur, so 88% 
of the numbers within 1 to 1,000 are not achievable. When the values of the RPN are graphed as a 
histogram (Figure 2-7), the large gaps between RPN values along the scale are clear. Most RPN 
values are well below 500, with only 6% above 500. The average RPN value is 166.4 while the 
median is 105. There are only 6 RPN values that can be formed by a unique set of SOD variables, 
yet RPNs 60, 72, and 120 can be formed 24 different ways (J. Bowles, 2004). The multiple 
replications lead to the low number of achievable RPN values. 
 
 
Figure 2-7. RPN histogram showing the frequency of occurrence for individual RPN.  
Note. Adapted from J. Bowles (2004). 
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The high frequency of similar RPN values makes prioritization difficult because a similar RPN 
value shows no difference in the failure effect (L.-Y. Chen & Yeh, 2014). Many researchers 
identify the varying severities denoted from a common RPN value as a shortcoming of traditional 
FMEA (Gilchrist, 1993; Mentes & Ozen, 2015; Pillay & Wang, 2003; Rhee, 2005; Sawhney, 
Subburaman, Sonntag, Rao, & Capizzi, 2010; Xiao, Huang, Li, He, & Jin, 2011). For example, 
Table 2-9 shows all the combinations of SOD variables that result in an RPN value of 150. As 
seen in Table 2-3, a severity of 3 equates to Slight end-user annoyance, slight deterioration in the 
performance or margin, and a severity of 10 equates to product, end user, or plant safety at risk. 
The RPN value shows no difference between end users being annoyed compared to their safety 
being at risk from a product. For example, in the case of a passenger on an airliner, a severity of 3 
may be assigned to a chair that does not properly recline. A severity of 10 may be assigned to the 
oxygen bag not deploying during depressurization, depriving the passenger of oxygen. Thus, a 
common RPN can mask the increased urgency of a problem (Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
 
Table 2-9. Possible SOD Combinations for RPN of 150 
Severity Occurrence Detection RPN 
3 5 10 150 
3 10 5 150 
5 3 10 150 
5 5 6 150 
5 6 5 150 
5 10 3 150 
6 5 5 150 
10 3 5 150 
10 5 3 150 
 
There are also large gaps in the scale, creating difficulty in ranking the RPN value. There are 880 
RPN values which are not achievable; therefore, it is difficult to determine the degree of 
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improvement for an implemented change. An RPN reduction from 700 to 648 is the same scale 
reduction as from 81 to 80, based on achievable numbers. Table 2-10 shows a sample of RPN 
value gaps from an RPN value and the next achievable RPN value. In some cases, these gaps can 
be as large as 100. The RPN value becomes more ambiguous when looking at the actual SOD 
variable values. For example, an RPN value of 81 could have SOD = 9,1,9 and SOD = 9,3,3. If 
there is an increase in occurrence by 1, along with a decrease of 1 in both severity and detection, 
the new RPN values would be 128 (SOD = 8,2,8) and 64 (SOD = 8,4,2). With the same changes 
made to both initial RPN values of 81, one decreases to 64 while the other increased to 128. 
Based on the new RPN values, one failure mode is now double the RPN value of the other failure 
mode. 
 
Table 2-10. Sample Gaps in RPN Value Scale 
RPN value 
Next 
achievable 
RPN value 
Gap 
50 54 4 
80 81 1 
90 96 6 
96 98 2 
100 105 5 
180 189 9 
200 210 10 
250 252 2 
252 256 4 
256 270 14 
450 480 30 
480 486 6 
640 648 8 
648 700 52 
800 810 10 
810 900 90 
900 1000 100 
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During an in-depth review of alternative FMEA processes, H.-C. Liu et al. (2013) grouped the 
number of occurrences for common complaints with ambiguity of the RPN value, as shown in 
Table 2-11. The common themes identified by H.-C. Liu et al. (2013) are also identified in this 
literature review. 
 
Table 2-11. Common Themes in RPN Value Ambiguity 
Ambiguity of RPN value Number of 
Studies 
Relative importance among SOD variables is not taken into consideration 45 
Different combinations of SOD variables produce the same RPN value, 
but risk may be different 
33 
SOD variables are subjective and difficult to determine 21 
RPN multiplication is an incorrect mathematical operation 14 
RPN value cannot be used to measure the effectiveness of corrective 
actions 
12 
Large gaps in RPN values make it difficult to determine the impact of 
corrective actions due to holes 
10 
Note. Adapted from H.-C. Liu et al. (2013). 
 
2.2.6 Attempts to Address RPN Ambiguity 
There have been multiple attempts to address the ambiguity of the RPN value. Select attempts 
include the addition of weighting factors to the RPN formula (Ben-Daya & Raouf, 1996; 
Bevilacqua et al., 2000; Xiao et al., 2011), changes to the RPN formula (Li & Zeng, 2016; 
Sawhney et al., 2010), and creation of a new prioritization metric. H.-C. Liu et al. (2013) 
discovered the top three attempts for creation of a new prioritization metric are through fuzzy-
based analysis, grey theory, and a cost-based metric. The following sections describe the different 
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methods that have been proposed in the literature and critique their ability to address the 
ambiguity of the RPN value.  
2.2.6.1 Fuzzy Theory and Grey Theory 
Fuzzy logic systems can help address uncertainty in a calculation or system. When applied to 
FMEA, the fuzzy inference system, the most popular, is described as having three main elements: 
fuzzification, fuzzy inference, and defuzzification (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). The fuzzification is the 
creation of overlapping linguistic terms to cover the full range of a system (Garrido, 2012). The 
linguistic terms, applied by the FMEA team to the SOD variables, are meant to reduce the 
subjectivity of the SOD-variable inputs from the individual FMEA team members. For example, 
a set of linguistic terms may be Very High, High, Moderate, Low, and Very Low. These terms are 
called fuzzy modifiers and are set up so they are neither entirely true nor entirely false (Garrido, 
2012). The next portion involves the fuzzy inference, which is done through the creation of fuzzy 
“If-Then” rule sets for measuring risk based on the linguistic terms. The final step is the 
defuzzification of the data, which yields a risk number used for prioritization (H.-C. Liu et al., 
2013). This risk number is the replacement for the RPN value.  
Grey number theory is a method that allows evaluation of uncertain decisions in a practical 
application (Pancholi & Bhatt, 2016). It is based on making a decision when the information is 
incomplete or when portions are missing. Grey theory uses intervals where the upper limits and 
lower limits are not known, called grey numbers, as well as an interval in the middle with known 
values called white numbers (Pancholi & Bhatt, 2016). 
2.2.6.1.1 Fuzzy-Based Studies 
L.-Y. Chen and Yeh (2014) perform an evaluation of three alternative RPN-value calculations. 
The first alternative is a two-factor sort where the RPN value is calculated by multiplying the 
severity and occurrence rankings. The second alternative uses a simple sort method. In this 
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calculation, the severity becomes the hundredth digit, the occurrence becomes the tenths digit, 
and detection becomes the unit digit. The final method uses a fuzzy method that calculates the 
fuzzy values for detection and severity and replaces the occurrence ranking with the process 
capability (Cpk). The fuzzy RPN value is the product of the fuzzy severity, fuzzy detection, and 
the Cpk. Table 13 presents a comparison using a wafer manufacturing process on the three 
alternatives and the traditional RPN value calculation. Chen and Yeh have found that traditional 
RPN values, two-factor-sort RPN values, and simple-sort RPN values produce similar numbers 
for the failures modes and make the sequence ambiguous. The fuzzy RPN value creates many 
more unique values. Out of the 28 combinations evaluated, traditional RPNs have 12 unique 
numbers, two-factor-sort RPNs have 8 unique numbers, simple-sort RPNs have 17 unique 
numbers, and fuzzy RPNs have 28 unique numbers. 
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Table 2-12. RPN-Value Analyses in a Wafer Manufacturing Process 
Failure 
factor 
Traditional RPN 
Two-factor sort 
RPN 
Simple sort RPN Fuzzy RPN 
Value Sequence Value Sequence Value Sequence Value Sequence 
A11 45 8 15 5 533 13 82.8 23 
B11 84 1 28 1 743 1 168.38 3 
B12 42 9 14 6 723 2 113.84 14 
C11 72 3 18 4 634 5 162.24 4 
C12 36 11 12 7 623 9 155.74 5 
D11 72 3 18 4 634 5 109.01 18 
D12 48 7 12 7 624 8 93.56 22 
E11 72 3 24 2 634 3 135.92 8 
F11 45 8 15 5 533 13 183.42 2 
F12 40 10 20 3 542 12 136.1 7 
G11 80 2 10 8 544 10 114.83 13 
G12 40 10 15 5 542 12 78.28 26 
H11 60 4 12 7 625 7 48.04 28 
H12 54 5 18 4 633 6 59.24 27 
I11 30 12 10 8 523 16 120.86 11 
I12 30 12 15 5 532 14 129.22 9 
I13 40 10 20 3 542 12 111.11 15 
I14 60 4 20 3 543 11 81.78 24 
J11 72 3 18 4 634 5 229.72 1 
J12 48 7 12 7 624 8 144.75 6 
K11 48 7 12 7 434 17 123.5 10 
L11 72 3 24 2 643 3 110.26 16 
L12 48 7 24 2 642 4 109.24 17 
L13 72 3 18 4 634 5 117.95 12 
M11 60 4 20 3 543 11 107.11 19 
M12 80 2 20 3 544 10 80.82 25 
M13 50 6 10 8 525 15 104.27 20 
N11 60 4 12 7 625 7 100.3 21 
Note. Adapted from L.-Y. Chen and Yeh (2014). 
 
Aikhuele and Turan (2016) seek to make it easier to leverage historical information during a 
product redesign by using intuitionistic fuzzy-logic technique for order by similarity to ideal 
solution (IF-TOPSIS) method. This method is used during multicriteria decision-making, which 
is an analysis like FMEA. The method starts with the FMEA team reviewing the past data and 
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creating a list of product components that fit the targeted parameters (e.g., high failure rates or 
low system availability). The team then looks at the SOD variables in linguistic terms. For 
example, probability of occurrence may be Very High, High, Moderate, Low, or Very Low. The 
values from the linguistic terms are combined and modified using a weight vector that creates the 
inputs for the fuzzy matrix. This matrix transforms the data into the exponential-related matrix. 
The closeness coefficient is derived from the matrix, which shows the optimal solution for rank, 
where a lower closeness coefficient number is desired. The authors compare four different IF-
TOPSIS versions along with traditional RPN (Table 14). The results show a general agreement in 
ranking between the IF-TOPSIS methods, with an approximately 70% agreement with traditional 
RPN ranking methods. The authors state the advantages over traditional RPN include the ability 
to model the indecisiveness of the FMEA team during the subjective assessments, and failure 
detection becomes more objective with the IF-TOPSIS method. 
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Table 2-13. Failure Ranking in IF-TOPSIS vs. RPN 
Product 
components 
New fuzzy 
model 
Fuzzy TOPSIS 
model 
IWF-
TOPSIS 
IFH-
TOPSIS 
RPN 
Method 
PM1 4 9 10 7 6 
PM2 6 13 8 9 10 
PM3 13 4 5 5 9 
PM4 5 6 2 6 3 
PM5 11 11 11 11 14 
PM6 10 15 14 15 10 
PM7 15 16 16 16 15 
PM8 7 2 15 4 13 
PM9 14 7 3 8 8 
PM10 1 1 1 1 1 
PM11 8 10 13 10 6 
PM12 3 3 4 3 4 
PM13 2 5 7 2 2 
PM14 12 14 12 14 10 
PM15 16 10 9 13 16 
PM16 9 15 6 12 5 
Note. Adapted from Aikhuele and Turan (2016). 
 
2.2.6.1.2 Grey-Theory Studies 
Pancholi and Bhatt (2016) use a multicriteria decision-making approach in an aluminum 
extruding plant to evaluate risks and failure modes and, in the process, help implement a 
maintenance schedule. They start with the traditional SOD variables and add maintenance 
variables including economic cost, spare parts, maintainability, and economic safety. Grey-
complex proportional assessment method (COPRAS-G) is used to evaluate the different variables 
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by creating a set of linguistic grey numbers for the variables. Pancholi and Bhatt follow a 
methodology based on COPRAS-G to create a prioritization metric they call “maintainability 
criticality index”. This is done by creating a decision matrix with criteria ranking in grey 
intervals. The decision matrix is then normalized, and the weight of each decision criteria is 
established. The next step is to calculate the relative significance through the maintainability 
criticality index. The final ranking is based on maintainability criticality index and highlights the 
largest risk in the system. 
Razi, Danaei, Ehsani, and Dolati (2013), evaluating the risk factors of a computer numerical 
control (CNC) machining process, propose a grey-theory-based FMEA for determining the 
largest risk factors. The first step is to determine the potential failures modes with respect to a 
CNC machine. The authors then create a set of linguistic terms for measuring the SOD variables. 
The FMEA team uses the linguistic terms to assess the severity, probability of occurrence, and 
likelihood of detection for each of the identified failure modes. The FMEA team then converts the 
rankings to a grey matrix, normalize the grey-matrix values, and cluster them to give a ranking of 
the highest risk factors in the system. 
2.2.6.1.3 Mixed-Method Studies 
Pillay and Wang (2003) find similar RPN values could mask increased urgency in a problem. The 
focus of their research is evaluating risk when the RPN value is the same. The authors use a fuzzy 
logic system to create 125 If-Then rule sets. They then reduce the amount of rule sets by 
combining similar rules, resulting in 35 If-Then rules. This reduced rule set is used with a 
linguistic variable term set (Remote, Low, Moderate, High, Very High) for the SOD variables. A 
defuzzified ranking is created to generate the risk and fuzzy risk priority number (FRPN) values. 
The authors also use grey theory along with fuzzy variables as an alternative approach. In a case 
study on a fishing vessel, traditional FMEA, fuzzy-based FMEA, and grey-theory FMEA all 
produced varying rankings, showing each method ranked risk differently (Pillay and Wang 
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(2003). Overall, all three methods produce the same top-three failure modes. The research thus 
shows that similar RPN values can denote varying risk. 
Zhou and Thai (2016) use both fuzzy logic and grey theory to replace the RPN value. They 
compare the two methods, where fuzzy logic creates the FRPN and grey theory creates the grey 
relational coefficient, using a case study for oil-tanker-equipment maintenance and failure. First, 
the FMEA team must create a fuzzy number set to be assigned to the linguistic terms for the SOD 
variables. The team then brainstorms failure modes and individually ranks each of the failure 
modes, using the fuzzy numbers for the SOD linguistic terms. An aggregate of the FMEA team’s 
response is used along with a weighting factor for importance. The weighted aggregate values for 
the individual SOD variables use alpha-level sets to give the FRPN. Next, a defuzzification is 
performed using the centroid defuzzification method to give the final FRPN value used for 
ranking.  
For the grey theory calculation, Zhou and Thai (2016) start with the same fuzzy linguistic terms 
for the SOD variables. The SOD variables are then defuzzified according to the membership 
function, and a crisp number is calculated. The grey relational coefficient is calculated, and 
weights are introduced to determine the degree of relation between potential causes and failures. 
In the grey relation method, a smaller relational coefficient denotes higher risks. In the case study 
on oil-tanker equipment used by a global shipping company, Zhou and Thai (2016) find 17 
different failure modes. The priority rankings between the fuzzy theory and grey theory methods 
are nearly identical (Table 2-14). 
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Table 2-14. Grey Theory vs. FRPN 
Failure 
number 
Failure mode 
Grey relational 
coefficient 
Grey 
ranking 
FRPN 
FRPN 
ranking 
1 Auxiliary engine 0.55 8 4.44 8 
2 Auxiliary machinery 0.54 6 4.57 6 
3 Boiler 0.54 7 4.52 7 
4 Cargo pump 0.73 14 2.73 14 
5 Cargo system 0.84 17 2.03 17 
6 Desk machinery 0.50 3 5.24 3 
7 Electrical 0.61 11 3.74 10 
8 Emergency equipment 0.66 12 3.18 12 
9 Hull part 0.77 15 2.42 15 
10 Hydraulic system 0.68 13 3.04 13 
11 Inert gas system 0.61 10 3.67 11 
12 Main engine 0.38 1 8.07 1 
13 Monitoring system 0.51 4 5.09 4 
14 Mooring 0.57 9 4.28 9 
15 Navigation equipment 0.42 2 6.96 2 
16 Piping system 0.53 5 4.66 5 
17 Steering gear 0.79 16 2.26 16 
Note. Adapted from Zhou and Thai (2016). 
 
2.2.6.1.4 Fuzzy Theory and Grey Theory Evaluation and Limitations 
Fuzzy theory and grey theory are attempts to address the ambiguity of the RPN value by 
replacing it with an alternative prioritization metric; fuzzy theory uses FRPN while grey theory 
uses grey relational coefficient. The above studies demonstrate how fuzzy and grey theory can 
account for uncertainty and subjectivity of the traditional RPN method. Membership functions are 
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used in fuzzy analysis and grey theory to help reduce uncertainty found in the generation of 
traditional RPN values (Zhou & Thai, 2016). Both methods show that a common RPN value can 
mask enhanced risk and can reduce the number of common RPN values during an analysis 
(Aikhuele & Turan, 2016; L.-Y. Chen & Yeh, 2014; Pillay & Wang, 2003).  
Fuzzy theory and grey theory are not without their limitations. Like the traditional RPN value, 
FRPN and the grey correlation coefficient cannot be compared to other studies. The rankings are 
on an interval scale. An FRPN of 200 is twice that of an FRPN of 100, but this does not mean that 
the failure mode is twice the risk. H.-C. Liu et al. (2013) list the following limitations to these 
methods: Creation of the fuzzy If-Then rule sets and membership functions are time consuming 
and expensive, If-Then rule statements that result in similar consequence but have different input 
values cannot be distinguished, and complex calculations are difficult to perform and can result in 
information loss. The authors also list the following limitations of attempts to reduce the amount 
of If-Then rule sets and membership functions: Rule sets that have similar consequences with 
different input values are indistinguishable (i.e., there is no observable difference between failure 
modes); FMEA team members have different judgments, so rule set reduction can become 
inconsistent; and reduced rule sets are incomplete sets. 
The SOD variable used in fuzzy theory and grey theory is an underlying weakness of the 
traditional FMEA that is not addressed by these methods. 
2.2.6.2 Cost-Based FMEA 
FMEA is a dependability analysis method that is used to prevent failure cost in the CoQ. A 
common theme identified during the literature review is the lack of a costing element in the RPN 
prioritization metric (Childs et al., 2012; Dong, 2007; Gilchrist, 1993; Kmenta & Ishii, 2005; 
Pandian, 2010; Rahimi, Jamshidi, Ait-Kadi, & Ruiz, 2015; Rhee, 2005; Rhee & Ishii, 2003; 
 44 
 
Tarum, 2001; von Ahsen, 2008). Cost is a universal measure of consequence and can measure the 
severity of an occurrence (Kmenta & Ishii, 2005).  
2.2.6.2.1 Cost-Based FMEA Studies 
The concept of a cost-based prioritization metric is first introduced by Gilchrist (1993), who 
questions the multiplication of the three SOD variables and notes they are non-linear and should 
not be multiplied or added. Gilchrist proposes using expected cost as the prioritization metric. 
This would allow for a universal number across FMEAs that could be compared with other 
studies. The expected cost would be used to determine the likelihood of a customer receiving a 
defective unit. 
 
Equation 2-3:  Expected cost (Gilchrist (1993). 
𝐸𝐶 = 𝐶 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑓 ∗ 𝑃𝑑 
where EC is the expected cost, C is the cost of a failure occurring, n is the number of 
products being built, Pf is the probability of a failure occurring, and Pd is the probability of a 
failure reaching the customer.   
 
Gilchrist states probability is an appropriate measure of chance of occurrence, and cost is an 
appropriate measure of severity.  
Kmenta (2001) expands on Gilchrist’s early idea by introducing the concept of failure scenario 
cost-based FMEA. Failure scenarios are the total effect of a failure introduction (cause) to the 
failure discovery (effect) and include the intermediate effects along the path. Kmenta uses an 
example of brake failure to show the different scenarios that could occur (Figure 2-8). Given 6 
initial causes and 2 end effects, there is a total of 12 different brake-failure scenarios. 
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Figure 2-8. Failure scenarios for brake failure.  
Note. Adapted from Kmenta (2001). 
 
For a given failure scenario, the effect may be caught during prototype testing or discovered by 
the end user. The probability for the different cause and effects during a product’s life cycle is 
shown in Figure 2-9, where the probability of an individual failure is the product of the 
probability of the failure occurring and the probability of the end effect. 
 
Figure 2-9. Product-life-cycle failure scenarios.  
Note. Adapted from Kmenta (2001). 
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Kmenta states the probability of detection is part of the probability of failure and that a separate 
calculation is not needed. The failure cost is the probability of failure multiplied by the cost of 
failure occurrence, and the total failure cost is the summation of all failure scenarios for a given 
product. This results in the “total expected cost” shown in Equation 2-4. 
 
Equation 2-4: Total expected cost (adapted from Kmenta (2001) 
𝑇𝐸𝐶 =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where pi is the probability failure i occurs, ci is the cost associated with failure i, and n is the 
number of scenarios. 
 
Rhee and Ishii (2003) begin with the TEC calculation proposed by Kmenta (2001) and further 
define the cost of failure in a product while including a calculation for occurrence. This variable 
could be a one-time event or an expected number of occurrences over the life cycle of the 
product. Rhee and Ishii (2003) state the likelihood of detection and severity can be measured in 
terms of time loss. The cost of failure is shown to have three major categories: labor cost (LC), 
material cost (MC), and opportunity cost (OC). 
 
Equation 2-5: Labor cost (adapted from Rhee and Ishii (2003) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑛 𝑥 {[𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑁] + [𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑁] + [𝐷𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑁]} 
where n is the number of occurrences, DE is the detection time, LR is the hourly labor rate, 
PN is the number of personnel, FT is the time to fix, and DL is the delay time. 
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Equation 2-6: Material cost (from Rhee and Ishii (2003) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑛 ∗ 𝐶𝑃 
where n is the number of occurrences, and CP is the cost of the product. 
 
Equation 2-7: Opportunity cost (from Rhee and Ishii (2003) 
𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = [𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝐷𝐿] ∗ 𝑂𝐶 
where DE is the detection time, FT is the time to fix, DL is the delay time, and 
OC is the hourly opportunity cost. 
 
Rhee and Ishii (2003) introduce a modified FMEA table using the updated definition for failure 
cost, naming it life cost-based failure mode and effect analysis (LCB-FMEA). Going through the 
LCB-FMEA, the team establishes the labor cost, material cost, and opportunity cost, which can 
be summed for the total failure cost. The total failure cost is then multiplied by the probability of 
failure occurrence to give the total expected failure cost and is the prioritization metric in an 
LCB-FMEA analysis. 
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Table 2-15. LCB-FMEA 
Failure 
Mode 
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cause 
of 
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Note. Adapted from Rhee and Ishii (2003). 
 
Rhee (2005) makes a further advancement on the life cost-based calculation. The labor cost and 
material cost calculations are modified using the given equations: 
 
Equation 2-8: Labor cost (from Rhee (2005) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑟 𝑥 {[𝐷𝐸 ∗ 𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑁] + [𝐹𝑇 ∗ 𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑁 ∗ 𝑆𝑁] + [𝐷𝐿 ∗ 𝐿𝑅]} 
where r is the number of recurrences, DE is the detection time, LR is the hourly labor rate, 
PN is the number of personnel, SN is the number of systems affected by the failure, FT is the 
time to fix, and DL is the delay time. 
 
Equation 2-9: Material cost (from Rhee (2005) 
𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝐶𝑃 ∗ 𝑆𝑁 
where r is the number of recurrences, CP is the cost of the product, and SN is the  
number of systems affected by the failure. 
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Rhee (2005) researches the reliability of a system—specifically, the ability of a system to perform 
its intended function at any given time. This is measured through the availability of the system, 
given by the following equation: 
 
Equation 2-10:  Availability (from Rhee (2005) 
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑈𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠
=  
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹 + 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
 
where MTBF is mean time between failure, and MTTR is mean time to repair. 
 
Rhee (2005) performs a case study of the magnet system on a linear collider to predict the 
availability of the system at any given time. The linear collider has a target availability of 85%. 
Rhee uses a Monte Carlo simulation method (MCM) on the magnet subsystems, given their 
manufacturers reported MTBF and MTTR rates to account for uncertainty in the LCB-FMEA 
methodology. This simulation allows evaluation of different design alternatives to meet the 
system availability target. Rhee (2005) performed a comparison between traditional FMEA, 
LCB-FMEA, and LCB-FMEA with Monte Carlo simulation. As seen in Table 2-16, the failure 
cost varies for the different top failure modes with each method. Introducing the Monte Carlo 
simulation for probability estimation can significantly increase the failure cost of a failure mode 
due to uncertainty in the occurrence.  
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Table 2-16. Failure Cost vs. Method 
Method Failure Cost 
RPN $1.1M 
LCB-FMEA $5.2M 
LCB-FMEA with MCM  $11.5M 
Note. From Rhee (2005). 
 
Rhee’s (2005) study shows how empirical data can be used to achieve desired reliability when 
designing a system.  
Kmenta and Ishii (2005) perform an evaluation of RPN compared to cost-based prioritization 
metrics used during an FMEA. They use a SB-FMEA to compare to traditional FMEA. In 
traditional FMEA, there would be separate spreadsheets and evaluations of a component, 
subsystem, and system; this creates a disassociation between the separate spreadsheets because 
RPNs from different evaluations cannot be compared. The SB-FMEA allows for a component, 
subsystem, and system to be included in a comprehensive spreadsheet. In a previous study, 
Kmenta (2001) provides the total expected cost formula (Equation 2-4). Kmenta and Ishii (2005) 
use a theoretical example to estimate potential expected failure costs to RPN and include the 
following three assumptions in the calculation: 
Assumption 1: “There is a consistent relationship between occurrence and probability” (Kmenta 
& Ishii, 2005, p.1031). 
Assumption 2: “A consistent mapping exists between severity and cost” (Kmenta & Ishii, 2005, 
p.1031). 
Assumption 3: “There is a scale relating detection to the probability of non-detection” (Kmenta & 
Ishii, 2005, p.1031). 
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Based on the industry, there can be a higher cost scale associated with severity such as in that of 
an aerospace organization compared to a flooring company. Kmenta and Ishii (2005) discover 
there can be different failure cost with the same RPN and different RPNs with the same failure 
cost. Therefore, RPN is not a predictor of expected failure cost. They also argues a change should 
only be implemented when it is cost effective, but there is no calculation presented to determine 
cost effectiveness. 
The cost-oriented FMEA is introduced by von Ahsen (2008). von Ahsen states traditional FMEA 
is insufficient for ranking failure mode because there is no economic consideration to the failure 
mode. The lack of a cost factor makes it difficult to know where money for improvements should 
be spent. A failure mode found during a built-in-test would give a low likelihood of detection 
ranking and a low RPN even when there is a high cost associated with finding and repairing the 
failure mode. von Ahsen seeks to develop a modified FMEA risk prioritization metric with a cost 
base for prioritizing failure modes and allocating limited resources for corrective actions. von 
Ahsen proposes the cost-oriented RPN (RPNC), which is focused on cost and probability of a 
failure reaching the customer. The RPNC risk prioritization metric is a dollar value where higher 
dollar value indicates higher risk of failure mode. To compare the two methods, von Ahsen 
performs a cost-oriented FMEA and a traditional FMEA at an automotive supplier. During the 
process, the RPNC formula is found too computationally difficult for the users at the automotive 
supplier, so the method is simplified to use probabilities expressed in terms of ranks, similar to 
traditional FMEA. The result shows that the cost-oriented risk prioritization metric, RPNC, gives 
a different risk priority than the traditional RPN. 
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Table 2-17. Cost-Oriented FMEA vs. Traditional FMEA 
Failure mode number Traditional RPN Traditional ranking RPNC New rank 
7 224 4 14953.48 1 
9 112 7 4687.87 2 
8 168 5 4351.60 3 
12 112 7 1065.00 4 
Note. From von Ahsen (2008). 
 
2.2.6.2.2 Cost-Based FMEA Evaluation and Limitations 
Gilchrist (1993) proposes a cost-based FMEA, replacing the RPN risk prioritization metric with 
failure cost. The cost metric is the product of the cost of failure, probability the failure reaches the 
customer, and probability the failure occurs. It is a measure that shows the cost incurred for a 
customer to receive a defective product. von Ahsen (2008) attempts to improve on Gilchrist’s 
(1993) method by adding multiple probabilities of customer reactions and internal and external 
costs to the equation. The equation is so computationally difficult to perform that even FMEA 
experts do not use it during a case study (von Ahsen, 2008).  
Kmenta (2001) states the probability of a defective product is part of the probability of failure and 
that a separate calculation in not needed. Kmenta (2001) introduces the total expected cost 
(Equation 2-4), which is a sum of various scenarios’ individual failure costs that are the product 
of the probability of failure and failure cost. Rhee and Ishii (2003) and Rhee (2005) modify the 
failure-cost metric to include the life-cost factor by incorporating a product quantity to the metric 
and further defining the cost of failure through time loss. Kmenta and Ishii (2005) compare the 
RPN prioritization metric to the total failure-cost prioritization metric and conclude the RPN 
prioritization metric does not correspond to failure cost. Kmenta and Ishii (2005) also state an 
improvement or corrective action should be made on a product when the total cost to implement 
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the action is the same or lower than the TEC. The TEC/EFC does address the ambiguity of the 
RPN prioritization metric formulation by removing the underlining fault with the multiplication 
of the SOD variables. The TEC/EFC is based on two ratio scales, probability and cost, where 
multiplication is an admissible process (Kmenta, 2001).   
There are still limitations in the research with respect to the TEC/EFC replacing RPN as a 
prioritization metric. There is no equation or methodology present that defines the cost to 
implement an improvement or corrective action. The concept of limited resources is also not 
addressed in failure cost as a prioritization metric.  
2.2.7 Research Gaps 
Researchers identify multiple limitations to the FMEA process. The length of time to perform an 
FMEA and the life-cycle stage in which to perform FMEA are easily solved, but the ambiguity of 
the RPN prioritization metric is a true flaw. There have been attempts to modify the RPN by 
adding weight factors or variables and changing the RPN formula, but the modifications use 
multiplication of ordinal variables, which is an improper mathematical transformation (J. Bowles, 
2004; Kmenta, 2001; Rhee & Ishii, 2003).  
The largest concentration of studies devoted to addressing the ambiguity of the RPN prioritization 
metric are in fuzzy-based analysis, grey relational theory, and cost-based metrics (H.-C. Liu et al., 
2013). Fuzzy-based analysis and grey relational theory have shown that common RPN values can 
mask enhanced risk for a particular failure mode and can reduce the number of common 
prioritization values (Aikhuele & Turan, 2016; L.-Y. Chen & Yeh, 2014; Pillay & Wang, 2003). 
The prioritization metrics produced by fuzzy theory (i.e., FRPN) and grey theory (i.e., grey 
relational coefficient) cannot be compared to other studies and are on an interval scale. The 
interval scale shows a possible range of values, but position between values are not relative to one 
another (Terrell, 2016). An FRPN of 500 is twice that of an FRPN of 250, but this does not mean 
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that the failure mode is at twice the risk. H.-C. Liu et al. (2013) show that the time and expense 
involved with creating membership functions and complex calculations can lead to information 
loss and detract from the methods use in practice. Fuzzy-based analysis and grey theory, which 
use SOD variable rankings, multiple linguistic terms, and membership functions, do not address 
the underlying SOD variable weakness of the RPN metric. Multiplying the subjective SOD 
variables is the first incorrect step. Any transformation or weighting after multiplying is masking 
the fundamental weakness of the RPN prioritization metric. Fuzzy-based analysis and grey theory 
only reduce the chance of having a similar RPN value, thus making the ranking seem more 
effective. 
Cost-based FMEA replaces the SOD variables with the ratio values for cost and probability, thus 
removing the underlying weakness of the ordinal SOD variables. von Ahsen (2008) demonstrates 
that a failure-cost prioritization metric that is computationally complex is not likely to be 
accepted in practice. The proposed methods do not define an economic factor for corrective 
action or resource allocation. The methods use expected failure cost as the prioritization metric 
but do not include a provision to evaluate effectiveness. 
More work is needed to determine the best way to measure and prioritize risk. A new risk 
prioritization method must have a decision-support system to determine when to implement a 
corrective action or improvement (H.-C. Liu et al., 2016). This is necessary because not all 
corrective actions or improvements can be deployed on a system due to finite resources, including 
schedule and budget (Khorshidi, Gunawan, & Ibrahim, 2016). Corrective actions or 
improvements should also not be implemented if they are not economically sustainable 
(Carmignani, 2009; Cheah et al., 2011; Kmenta & Ishii, 2005).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
ECONOMIC IMPACT FMEA METHODOLOGY 
3. Economic Impact FMEA Methodology 
This chapter introduces the economic impact failure mode and effects analysis (EI-FMEA) 
methodology. I first explain the concept and objectives of the methodology. Next, I present the 
input variables for the probability of failure and the cost of failure. The failure cost calculation is 
discussed along with a detailed explanation of the economic-impact-value (EIV) risk 
prioritization metric. This chapter concludes with the EI-FMEA spreadsheet template and a 
research summary. 
3.1 Economic Impact FMEA 
FMEA is a dependability analysis technique in use since the 1940s. It is a tool meant to improve 
the quality of a product, system, software, or process through the reduction of potential failures 
by implementing corrective actions, but inherent limitations, like the RPN metric, make 
traditional FMEA ineffective (Jiang et al., 2016). Many attempts have been made to improve the 
FMEA method and the RPN metric, with varying success (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). Cost-based 
methods (Kmenta & Ishii, 2005; Rhee, 2005) replace the RPN with an expected-failure-cost 
metric that addresses some of the limitations found in the body of knowledge, but more work is 
needed to refine the approach.  
The EI-FMEA is a cost-based method that replaces the RPN metric with the EIV risk 
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prioritization metric which measures risk in terms of economic loss due to a failure event by 
looking at what can go wrong, the probability of occurrence, and the effect of occurrence. The 
EIV risk prioritization metric is a decision-support system that ranks corrective actions based on 
failure-cost reduction and determines when a corrective action should be implemented.  
3.2 Probability of Failure 
Probability theory measures the randomness and uncertainty that governs events. In probability 
theory, probability is the chance of an event or given outcome. Prior to the event, it is impossible 
to say which outcome will occur (Borovkov, 2013). For failure analysis, probability is the chance 
of a failure event occurring over a period of time. Take the example of a manufacturing process 
that fabricates pressure valves. A random sample size of 100 (i.e., n=100) is chosen from a 
population of parts to test the pressure valve, and the number of failures (i.e., not meeting the 
specified pressure requirement) in the sample is recorded.  
 
Table 3-1. Pressure Valve Failure 
Sample set 
Number of 
failures 
1 6 
 
Equation 3-1. Probability of failure 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 =  𝑝𝑓 =  
𝐹𝑛
𝑛
  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒. 
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In the first sample set, the probability of a pressure valve not meeting its pressure specification is 
6/100 = .06 or 6%. While the probability of failure for the sample set is 6%, this may not be 
representative of the entire population. The experiment is extended to include 100 sample sets 
with 100 components in each set. 
 
Table 3-2. Pressure Valve Failure 
 
 
Using 100 samples sets with 100 components in each set, there are 364 failures. The probability 
of a pressure valve not meeting its pressure specification is 364/10000 = .0364 or 3.64%. As the 
number of trials or sample sets increases, the probability of failure approaches a constant rate 
(Taylor, 2012). For the pressure valve example, an estimation of the probability of failure would 
be 3.64%. 
In section 2.2.5.3.1, I introduce the ambiguity of the probability of occurrence variable for 
FMEA. Traditional FMEA converts the probability of failure into an ordinal value that is often 
between 1 and 10. This can lead to an ambiguous scale where the probability of failure can vary 
widely, depending on the industry (see Figure 3-1). 
 
Sample set 
Number of 
failures 
 1 6 
 2 3 
 ….  
 99 5 
 100 2 
Total 10000 364 
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Figure 3-1. Occurrence by industry scale. 
 
Removing the ordinal scale addresses the ambiguity of the probability of occurrence variable by 
replacing it with the probability of failure. 
3.2.1 Failure Scenarios 
In traditional FMEA, individual FMEAs are applied at each system level where failure modes are 
listed by cause and effect. This relationship, shown as a cause-and-effect chain, can lead to 
confusion when the effect of the failure is not observed until a higher system level. Figure 3-2 
shows a block diagram for a system that has four levels, where a failure cause at Subassembly e 
may become a failure effect at Assembly C. Traditional FMEA uses separate spreadsheets for 
each system level, which can obscure the true cause-and-effect chain throughout an entire system 
(Kmenta & Ishii, 2005). 
0.0000001
0.0000010
0.0000100
0.0001000
0.0010000
0.0100000
0.1000000
1.0000000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
L
o
g
ar
it
h
m
ic
 P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
O
cc
u
rr
en
ce
Occurrence Rank
Occurrence by Industry
Generic
Automotive
Marine
 59 
 
  
Figure 3-2. Block diagram of system to component level.  
Note. Adapted from Birolini (2014). 
 
Kmenta and Ishii (2005) introduce the concept of failure scenarios. In failure scenarios, the entire 
system is placed on a single spreadsheet to show the full extent of the cause-and-effect chain. A 
failure scenario is defined as an undesired cause-and-effect chain where there is a probability of 
negative consequence for each potential failure scenario (Kmenta & Ishii, 2005). Using failure 
scenarios, users can look at potential failure chains throughout a product’s life cycle. For 
example, a failure effect on System II can be shown from a failure cause at Component C1.  
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3.2.1.1 Marine Engine Water Pump 
In marine craft engines, a cooling system circulates fluid through the engine block. The cooling 
system includes the following components: a water pump impeller, a water pump housing, a 
water pump top plate, and a thermostat. The impeller is made from a flexible material that 
conforms to the water pump housing to create a low- and high-pressure side during rotation to 
circulate fluid through the engine. The top plate on the water pump housing has a gap setting to 
allow the impeller to rotate freely while providing sufficient pressure and flow rates. A gap 
setting that is too small can cause binding in the impeller, reducing the flow rate, while a setting 
that is too large can cause a loss of pressure which also reduces the flow rate. Figure 3-3 shows a 
failure scenario map for the water pump. There are 16 failure scenarios possible across the life 
cycle of the cooling system, where each of the scenarios becomes a row on the FMEA 
spreadsheet. In the failure map, a failure mode introduced during fabrication could cause an effect 
at manufacturing inspection or during the operation period. 
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Figure 3-3. Failure scenario map for marine craft engine cooling system. 
 
3.2.2 Life Cycle Failure Probability 
In life cycle failure probability, there are failures introduced (i.e., cause) and failures discovered 
(i.e., effects). The chain connecting the failure cause to the failure effect is the failure scenario. 
Throughout the life cycle, cause and effects may be introduced at multiple locations. Design, 
manufacture, installation, and operation are the four main categories in a product’s life cycle 
(Rhee, 2005). At each of the categories, there is a chance for a failure to be introduced as well as 
a chance for a failure to be discovered. Figure 3-4 shows the different points where failures can 
be introduced or discovered based on their location in the product’s life cycle. The probability of 
the failure scenario is the product of the probability of introduced failure by the probability of 
discovered failure in a given life cycle. Probability of the failure scenario can also be understood 
as the product of the probability of the cause and the probability of the effect. 
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Figure 3-4. Probability of failure by life cycle.  
Note. Adapted from Kmenta (2001). 
  
The marine engine water pump introduced in section 3.2.1.1 has 16 potential failure scenarios. 
The first failure cause is insufficient material during molding. This cause has three potential 
failure effects: manufacturer scrap, engine failure, and reduced engine performance. The failure 
is introduced during the manufacturing life cycle during fabrication ((c) in Figure 3-4). The 
failure effect can be identified at the manufacturing inspection step (d) or during the operation life 
cycle as a field failure (h). The first potential failure scenario is insufficient material during 
molding (i.e., p(c)), leading to manufacturer scrap (i.e., p(d|c)). Using the probability block 
diagram in Figure 3-5, the probability of the failure scenario is defined by; 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜 1 =  𝑝(1) = 𝑝(𝑐) ∗ 𝑝(𝑑|𝑐) =  .01 ∗ .9 = 0.009 = 0.9%. 
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The same process is used to define failure scenario 2 (i.e., engine failure) and failure scenario 3 
(i.e., reduced engine performance): 
𝑝(2) = 𝑝(𝑐) ∗ [1 − 𝑝(𝑑|𝑐)] ∗ [1 − 𝑝(𝑓|𝑐)] ∗ 𝑝(ℎ|𝑐) =  .01 ∗ .1 ∗ 1 ∗ (. 1 ∗ .2) = 0.00002; 
𝑝(3) = 𝑝(𝑐) ∗ [1 − 𝑝(𝑑|𝑐)] ∗ [1 − 𝑝(𝑓|𝑐)] ∗ 𝑝(ℎ|𝑐) =  .01 ∗ .1 ∗ 1 ∗ (.1 ∗ .8) = 0.00008. 
 
  
Figure 3-5. Failure probability block chart. 
 
For failure scenarios 2 and 3, pre-delivery inspection cannot discover the failure; therefore, the 
probability is zero. There are two possible failures that could be discovered as a field failure, 
where the sum of the probabilities of failure are equal to 1. 
3.3 Failure Cost 
A common way to measure risk is to determine the monetary impact of an event occurrence. 
When that event is failure, failure cost is the monetary measure of the risk. The cost of quality 
gives the concept of failure cost—the cost associated with finding and fixing products that do not 
meet their intended purpose or specification (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). Failure cost combines both 
internal and external failure costs and is a universal way to measure the severity or impact of a 
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failure. There are challenges associated with determining failure cost; cost can raise exponentially 
the further away a failure cause and failure effect occur from each other in the life cycle. Failure 
cost includes repair times, component costs, lost opportunity costs, and external failure costs. 
3.3.1 Repair Time and Cost Determination 
The total time required to determine the root cause of a failure and return a product to the 
previous known good condition is called the repair (restoration) time (Birolini, 2014). There are 
multiple variables for the repair time. After a failure effect is discovered, the time associated with 
determining the root cause is the detection time. The renewal time is the time it takes to fix, 
repair, or rework a failure to return to a known good condition. This includes the total hours for 
all personnel to remanufacture, reinstall, repair, or rework a product, as well as any delay or 
downtime during the process. 
 
  
Figure 3-6. Repair time flow chart. 
 
Repair time factors into the equation for repair cost (Equation 3-2). To determine repair cost, the 
repair time can use any time of measure, but the unit needs to be consistent throughout the 
equation. The time durations are the total labor time (e.g., hours) for the personnel addressing the 
failure, and the labor rate is the value per unit of time (e.g., dollars per hour) of the personnel.  
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Equation 3-2. Repair cost. 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐶𝑅) = (𝐷𝑇 +  𝑅𝑇) ∗  𝐿𝑅  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝑅𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑅 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑.  
 
The equation can be expanded if there are multiple labor rates for the personnel involved. When 
that occurs, the individual repair cost per labor rate (e.g., personnel discipline) is calculated and 
summed. For example, Table 3-3 shows a failure that requires both engineers and technicians to 
detect and renew the product. The repair cost per personnel is calculated and summed for the total 
repair cost. 
 
Table 3-3. Repair Cost by Personnel 
Personnel 
Detection 
time (hr) 
Renewal 
time (hr) 
Labor rate 
($/hr) 
Repair cost 
Engineer 4 2 $    150.00 $     900.00 
Technician 1 12 $      75.00 $     975.00 
      Total $  1,875.00 
  
3.3.2 Component Cost Determination 
When a failure occurs, an evaluation is performed to determine the root cause. After identifying 
the root cause, the renewal phase is initiated. To return a product back to specification, there often 
are costs associated with replacing or repairing components. Component costs are the actual 
monetary value used in the renewal of a product. For example, a circuit board that no longer 
supplies power per the original specification reveals a burst capacitor on the circuit board during 
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the failure investigation. Replacing the capacitor returns the circuit board back to the original 
specification. The component cost to renew the circuit board is the cost of the new capacitor.  
 
Equation 3-3. Component cost. 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐶𝐶) =  ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠. 
 
3.3.3 Lost Opportunity Cost Determination 
Another component to failure cost is the lost opportunity cost which is the missed value due to a 
failure. Lost opportunity cost is often calculated for a system or piece of equipment that produces 
value to a product. For example, a computer-controlled mill machines water passages into a 
cooling plate. The cooling passages increase the value of the water plate by $50. In an 8-hour 
shift, 20 cooling plates are machined on the mill. The opportunity cost (e.g., dollars per hour) of 
the mill can be found using Equation 3-4. 
 
Equation 3-4. Opportunity rate. 
𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑂𝐶) =  𝑉𝐴 𝑡⁄  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑡. 
 
The lost opportunity cost is then calculated by taking the product of the repair time and 
opportunity rate (Equation 3-5). 
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Equation 3-5. Lost opportunity cost. 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝐿𝐶) = (𝐷𝑇 +  𝑅𝑇) ∗  𝑂𝐶  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝑅𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒  
𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒. 
 
3.3.4 External Failure Cost Determination 
External failure cost occurs when an item is found to be non-conforming to its specification after 
it leaves the manufacturing plant and the customer has received it. It is a collection of costs that 
occur when a failure affects the end-user. While some of the costs are visible, others are non-
visible and can be difficult to determine as we discussed in section 2.1.2. Equation 3-6 provides a 
summation of the visible external failure costs. 
 
Equation 3-6. External failure cost. 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐸𝐶) = 𝑊𝐶 + 𝑅𝐶 + 𝐼𝐶 + 𝐷𝐶 + 𝐹𝐶 + 𝐿𝑆 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑊𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑅𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑠, 𝐼𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 
 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝐷𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑎 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟, 𝐹𝐶 𝑖𝑠 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐿𝑆 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑠𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑠. 
 
3.3.5 Failure Cost Determination 
The total failure cost is the sum of the repair cost, component cost, lost opportunity cost, and 
external failure cost (Equation 3-7). It represents the monetary cost per failure event that occurs 
over a product’s life cycle if no corrective actions are taken.  
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Equation 3-7. Failure cost. 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝐶) =  𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝐶 +  𝐿𝐶 + 𝐸𝐶 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑅 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝐶𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝐿𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦  
 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡.  
 
3.4 Expected Failure Cost 
The expected failure cost (EFC) is a concept first introduced by Gilchrist (1993) and later 
modified by Kmenta and Ishii (2005) and Rhee (2005). EFC measures the potential risk or loss 
from a failure event. In its basic form, the EFC is the product of the number of products affected, 
probability of failure, and cost of failure. Equation 3-8 represents the total expected failure cost of 
the sum of all potential failure scenarios for a given failure mode. 
 
Equation 3-8. Expected failure cost. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑖 ∗ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖, 𝐶𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖, 𝑞  
𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠. 
 
3.4.1 Expected Failure Cost of Automotive Fuel System 
An automotive fuel system has a specification to supply gasoline to an engine at a flow rate of 
400 to 420 pounds per hour (lb/hr) and a pressure of 60 psi. A potential failure mode for the fuel 
system is an inadequate fuel flow rate (e.g., less than 400 lb/hr). Table 3-4 shows the total EFC 
for an inadequate fuel flow rate for the automotive fuel system. There are three failure causes that 
result in four distinct failure effects. The quantity is the number of fuel systems that are produced 
in a year. The four failure scenarios result in an EFC of $601,460 per year. 
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Table 3-4. Fuel System EFC 
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Inadequate 
fuel flow  
Fuel line 
exceeds 
minimum 
bend radius  
Engine 
power loss 
34000 0.006 $450 $91,800 
Fuel line 
deterioration 
Engine stalls 
under load 
34000 0.0002 $450 $3,060 
Fuel pump 
voltage is 
low 
Engine stalls 34000 0.02 $120 $81,600 
Fuel pump 
is clogged 
Engine does 
not start 
34000 0.05 $250 $425,000 
     Total EFC $601,460 
Note. The quantity is the number of fuel systems produced in a year 
 
3.4.2 Expected Failure Cost Importance 
In traditional FMEA, the SOD variables are used to measure the risk of a failure mode. In section 
2.2.5.3.1, multiple instances of ambiguity with respect to the SOD variables are presented. For 
EI-FMEA, the SOD variables are replaced by the EFC to measure the baseline risk of a failure 
mode. The EFC converts the risk to a monetary value and permits the failure mode to be 
compared to other failure modes within the same analysis and to other analyses performed on 
different products. Evaluating risk based on monetary value allows for a universal translation. 
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3.5 Corrective Actions 
In failure analysis, finding the root cause of the failure is only part of the objective. The next 
objective is to investigate potential corrective actions. This is known as root cause corrective 
action. The EFC is the monetary value over the given time frame when no steps are taken to 
reduce the failure mode. A corrective action thus reduces the probability or cost of the failure 
mode, thereby reducing the potential failure cost. A new probability of failure and new failure 
cost are determined based on the corrective action. After the root cause of a failure is determined, 
the company looks to replace (renew) the product affected by the failure, as well as for ways to 
reduce the chance for reoccurrence.  
One of the pros of traditional FMEA is the recalculation of the RPN number due to a corrective 
action. Recalculation allows the user to determine, based on a reduction of the RPN, if a 
corrective action should be implemented. In current cost-based FMEA methods, there is no 
provision for the evaluation of a corrective action. The risk rank is based solely on the EFC. By 
only relying on the EFC, the cost to implement a corrective action is not considered. 
3.5.1 Implementation Cost 
The implementation cost is the one-time cost required to implement a given corrective action. 
This can include the costs to redesign a product, requalify a product, create new drawings, update 
processes, purchase new manufacturing equipment, or find new component suppliers. There is 
also a recurring implementation cost in EI-FMEA that occurs when the base cost of the product 
changes as a result of the corrective action or new components are introduced or replaced from 
the initial design. The recurring implementation cost (Equation 3-9) is found by summing the 
initial or baseline components of a product affected by a particular failure mode and subtracting 
the summation of the components of the product after implementation of a corrective action. If 
none of the components has changed or no new processes introduced, the value is zero. 
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Equation 3-9. Recurring implementation cost. 
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (∆𝐶𝐶) =  ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
− ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝐶𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖, 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠, 𝐶𝐶𝑗 𝑖𝑠  
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑗 (𝑖. 𝑒. , 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
 
3.5.2 Adjusted Expected Failure Cost 
The adjusted failure cost (AFC) is the delta EFC with the inclusion of the corrective action. The 
corrective action is intended to reduce the EFC and can be undertaken by reducing the probability 
of failure, the failure cost, the recurring implementation cost, or the combination of any of the 
three. The AFC determines the monetary impact of the corrective action on the failure mode. 
3.5.2.1 Calculating the Adjusted Failure Cost 
The EFC equation, Equation 3-8, is modified to become the AFC equation. The failure cost and 
probability of failure are replaced by the new failure cost and probability of failure after the 
implementation of the corrective action. The recurring implementation cost and implementation 
cost are new variables added for the AFC equation. Equation 3-10 represents the total adjusted 
failure cost of the sum of all potential failure scenarios for a given failure mode after a corrective 
action has been implemented. 
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Equation 3-10. Adjusted failure cost. 
𝐴𝐹𝐶 = ∑(𝐶𝑘 ∗ 𝑝𝑘 ∗  𝑞𝑘 ∗  ∆𝐶𝐶𝑘)
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝐼𝐶𝑘 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝐴 𝑘, 𝑝𝑘  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 
 𝐶𝐴 𝑘, 𝑞 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝐴 𝑘, ∆𝐶𝐶𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 
 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐴 𝑘, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝐶𝑘 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐴 𝑘, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 
𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠. 
 
Using the fuel system example from section 3.4.1, the implementation of the corrective action is 
evaluated in Table 3-5 using the AFC. 
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Table 3-5. Fuel System AFC 
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1 
Inadequate 
fuel flow  
Fuel line 
exceeds 
minimum 
bend radius  
Engine 
power 
loss 
34000 0.006 $450 $91,800 
New fuel line 
routing 
$3,000 $0 .0005 $450 $10,650 
2 
Fuel line 
deterioration 
Engine 
stalls 
under 
load 
34000 0.0002 $450 $3,060 
Replace 
rubber hose 
with Teflon-
lined hose 
$3,000 $10 .0001 $450 $18,300 
3 
Fuel pump 
voltage is 
low 
Engine 
stalls 
34000 0.02 $120 $81,600 
Protect fuel 
pump power 
wire from 
corrosion with 
environmental 
cap 
$2,000 $0.50 .01 $120 $22,400 
4 
Fuel pump 
is clogged 
Engine 
does not 
start 
34000 0.05 $250 $425,000 
Add pre filter 
to fuel pump 
intake. 
$5,000 $5 .01 $200 $345,000 
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In Table 3-5, the AFC decreases for items 1, 3, and 4 while increasing for item 2. The AFC 
method also allows for comparison and selection of the corrective action. Like EFC, 
minimization of the AFC is the goal.  
Table 3-6 shows a comparison of three different corrective actions the engineering staff could use 
to address the root cause of the fuel line exceeding the minimum bend radius. “Optimize fuel line 
routing” provides the minimum AFC and thus is the best potential corrective action. 
 
Table 3-6. AFC Corrective Action Comparison 
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1 
Fuel line 
exceeds 
minimum 
bend 
radius  
Engine 
power 
loss 
Optimize 
fuel line 
routing 
$3,000 $0 .0005 $450 $10,650 
Replace 
hose bends 
with hard 
line fittings 
$5,000 $50 .0001 $650 $113,500 
Replace 
rubber hose 
with hard 
line 
$3,000 $150 .0001 $800 $463,500 
 
3.6 Economic Impact Value 
The EIV is the risk prioritization metric for the EI-FMEA method. It is a comparison between the 
EFC and the AFC that also determines if a corrective action should be implemented. The EIV is 
 75 
 
found by subtracting the AFC from the EFC (Equation 3-11). A smaller number indicates larger 
savings (i.e., reduced failure cost) through the implementation of a corrective action, and a 
positive number indicates the corrective action should not be implemented because it is not cost 
effective. Risks are then ranked according to EIV numbers. EIV below zero are ranked in 
ascending order with the smallest number starting at 1 and values that are zero and above are 
marked as “no change or NC.” Implementing a corrective action on a value below zero indicates 
savings, a value of zero indicates no economic benefit, and a value higher than zero indicates 
additional cost. 
 
Equation 3-11. Economic impact value. 
𝐸𝐼𝑉 = 𝐴𝐹𝐶 − 𝐸𝐹𝐶 
 
The corrected failure cost (CFC) is the inherent failure cost associated with a given failure mode. 
It is determined by taking the minimum of the EFC and AFC. 
 
Equation 3-12. Corrected failure cost. 
𝐶𝐹𝐶 = min(𝐸𝐹𝐶, 𝐴𝐹𝐶) 
 
3.6.1 Calculating Economic Impact Value 
The EIV calculations for the fuel system example are shown in Table 3-7. 
.  
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Table 3-7. Fuel System Economic Impact Value 
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1 
Inadequate 
fuel flow  
Fuel line 
exceeds 
minimum bend 
radius  
$91,800 
Optimize fuel 
line routing 
$10,650 $-81,150 1 $10,650 
2 
Fuel line 
deterioration 
$3,060 
Replace rubber 
hose with 
Teflon-lined 
hose 
$18,300 $15,240 NC $3,060 
3 
Fuel pump 
voltage is low 
$81,600 
Protect fuel 
pump power 
wire from 
corrosion with 
environmental 
cap 
$22,400 $-59,200 3 $22,400 
4 
Fuel pump is 
clogged 
$425,000 
Add pre filter 
to fuel pump 
intake. 
$345,000 $-80,000 2 $345,000 
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3.6.2 Interpreting Economic Impact Value 
The EIV is the potential savings from the implementation of a corrective action. EIV can also 
determine if a corrective action is cost effective. In Table 3-7, there is a negative EIV for items 1, 
3, and 4. The risk prioritization rank gives the highest ranking to item 1. This shows the most 
possible savings come from addressing the failure mode in item 1. Item 2 has an EIV value of 
$15,240, showing that implementation of the corrective action costs more money than it will 
save. The risk prioritization rank is NC, meaning no corrective actions are pursued. Using the 
EIV’s risk prioritization rank allows more focus on failure cost reduction. 
3.7 EI-FMEA Procedure 
The EI-FMEA procedure is similar to the traditional FMEA procedure. A cross-disciplinary team 
is assembled to evaluate current products. Using the EI-FMEA method, different levels of 
product structure (e.g., components and systems), processing items, and design items can be 
combined in a single study, but design and process studies are often performed separately to save 
time. EI-FMEA normally uses a bottom-up approach to look at individual components and how 
failures at the component level can affect later systems and subsystems. At times, a team may use 
a top-down approach early in the life cycle, when individual components are not fully defined. 
The EI-FMEA flowchart is shown in Figure 3-7. 
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Figure 3-7. EI-FMEA flowchart. 
EIV below 
zero? 
No 
EI-FMEA report 
Start EI-FMEA method 
Collect component and process 
function information 
Determine potential failure modes 
Determine the effects of each 
failure 
Determine the root cause of each 
failure 
Determine failure cost 
Determine probability of failure 
Recommend corrective actions 
Rank EIV 
Implement corrective actions 
Yes 
Determine new failure cost 
Determine new probability of 
failure 
End of method 
Select EI-FMEA team 
Calculate EFC 
Calculate AFC 
Calculate EIV 
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The established EI-FMEA team begins by collecting component and process function 
information. This can include performing preliminary risk assessments, creating functional block 
diagrams, or constructing function state models. Potential failure modes are then listed along with 
all potential scenarios for failure effects and their root causes. The next step is to calculate the 
failure cost and probability of failure for each root cause and failure effect. 
After finding the probability of failure and failure cost, the EFC is calculated. The team then 
determines a corrective action for the root cause and calculates a new probability of failure and 
failure cost if the corrective action is implemented. The AFC is found using these new values. 
Comparing the EFC and AFC reveals the EIV that results from the implementation of the 
corrective action. The EIV is the risk prioritization metric where values below zero receive an 
ascending numeric value to rank failures based on the largest cost savings of the corrective action. 
Values that are zero or greater indicate that the corrective action is not cost effective, and these 
values do not receive a risk rank value. The EI-FMEA team’s final step is to document the results 
in a report that is re-evaluated on a time interval chosen by the team. 
3.7.1 EI-FMEA Template 
EI-FMEA is spreadsheet based to organize and calculate the team’s inputs. The beginning of the 
spreadsheet has a title block (Figure 3-8) that includes the date, item or process being evaluated, 
team members, revision, and review periods.  
 
 
Figure 3-8. EI-FMEA template title block. 
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The body of the spreadsheet has four main groups: failure evaluation, failure identification, 
corrective action, and prioritization. The failure evaluation group (Figure 3-9) includes the item 
number, item function, potential failure modes, potential root cause, potential effects of failure, 
and life-cycle categories for the origin and detection phase. 
 
 
Figure 3-9. EI-FMEA template, failure evaluation. 
 
The next section is the failure identification group (Figure 3-10). For this part of the spreadsheet, 
the inputs used to determine the EFC are added. The section begins with the product life cycle in 
years and the product quantity per year. Next is the probability of failure, followed by the repair 
time in hours, the labor rate in dollars per hour, and the lost opportunity cost in dollars per hour. 
The item cost is the total cost of the product being evaluated, and the repair component cost is the 
cost of the parts required to repair a product. These categories can help the team determine 
whether it is cost effective to repair a part or to replace it. The final column is the output for the 
EFC. When using a spreadsheet that can perform calculations, the formula for EFC (Equation 
3-8) should be used for automatic calculation as the input variables are added. 
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Figure 3-10. EI-FMEA template, failure identification. 
 
In the corrective action group (Figure 3-11), inputs are collected to determine the AFC. The 
corrective action is listed in the first column and is the plan to address the root cause. Next is the 
cost to implement the corrective action, the new probability of failure, the new repair time, and 
the new costs for the item and repair components with respect to the corrective action. The output 
from the corrective action is the recurring implementation cost (Equation 3-9) and the AFC 
(Equation 3-10). 
 
 
Figure 3-11. EI-FMEA template, corrective action. 
 
The final group of the EI-FMEA template concerns prioritization. This group is often calculated 
automatically using formulas for the EIV (Equation 3-11) and the CFC (Equation 3-12). Then, the 
team evaluates the different failure modes and determines the impact of a corrective action. The 
rank of the EIV, which correlates to the largest potential savings, shows which failure modes 
should be addressed. For a given failure scenario or EI-FMEA spreadsheet, the total savings can 
be found by summing the negative-value EIVs. 
 
 82 
 
 
Figure 3-12. EI-FMEA template, prioritization. 
 
3.8 Summary 
The EI-FMEA is a dependability analysis method that minimizes failure cost through prevention 
techniques. EI-FMEA, a new methodology for performing failure mode and effects analysis, was 
created to address traditional FMEA’s major limitation—ambiguity of the risk priority number 
and SOD variables (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). The SOD variables in traditional FMEA are replaced 
by the probability of failure and the failure cost for a given failure mode. The RPN is replaced by 
the EIV metric which uses potential savings as the prioritization method for corrective action 
implementation. Using the EIV risk prioritization metric also addresses gaps in other failure-cost-
based FMEAs (Kmenta & Ishii, 2005; Rhee, 2005) that rank risk based on the EFC. The EIV risk 
prioritization metric addresses the full economic impact by including the implementation cost and 
recurring costs associated with a corrective action. The EIV risk prioritization metric can also be 
used to allocate finite resources in a company. By ranking risk based on potential savings, the 
company understands where the allocation of resources will create the most cost-effective 
solution. This can help a company to be more agile, address waste in the system, reduce costs, 
and reduce cycle times, which can lead to a competitive advantage in the marketplace.  
By replacing the SOD variables, RPN, and EFC as a risk prioritization metric, the EI-FMEA 
method addresses the major limitation of traditional and cost-based FMEA methods. 
Additionally, the EIV risk prioritization metric meets the following requirements for a new risk 
prioritization method: 
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1. A new risk prioritization method must have a decision-support system to determine 
when to implement a corrective action or improvement (H.-C. Liu et al., 2016);  
2. Corrective actions or improvements should not be implemented if they are not 
economically sustainable (Carmignani, 2009; Cheah et al., 2011; Kmenta & Ishii, 
2005).
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FAILURE COST AND PROBABILITY OF FAILURE ESTIMATION 
4. Failure Cost and Probability of Failure Estimation 
This chapter will examine different methods for estimating failure cost and probability of failure. 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of the different methods available, followed by a 
detailed look at estimating cost and failure probabilities, and concludes with a summary. 
4.1 Estimation Methods 
The EI-FMEA method uses failure cost and the probability of failure as the main inputs for 
measuring the risk of a particular failure. As discussed previously, events are governed by 
randomness and uncertainty. There are multiple accepted ways to measure uncertainty, but users 
may not understand which ways are appropriate for the given circumstance. This chapter 
introduces some commonly used methods. The first part of this chapter focuses on failure cost 
estimation, including both internal and external failure costs. The second part focuses on 
probability of failure and lists multiple methods for estimating failure probability for different 
situations. By the end of the chapter, a collection of estimation techniques that support the EI-
FMEA method is introduced. 
4.2 Failure Cost 
Failure cost, both internal and external, contains the repair cost, component cost, and lost 
opportunity cost. Internal failure cost is a product’s failure cost prior to its delivery to the final 
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customer; external failure cost is a product’s failure cost after being received by the final 
customer (Juran & Godfrey, 1999). For example, in Figure 3-4, internal failures can be found at 
prototype testing, manufacturing inspection, or pre-delivery inspection life cycles, and external 
failures are found in the field during the operation life cycle. While component cost (Section 
3.3.2) and lost opportunity cost (Section 3.3.3) are easier to estimate, estimating repair cost is 
more difficult. 
4.2.1 Repair Cost 
Repair cost is the product of the total repair time and the labor rate. The labor rate can be 
determined based on the wages of the personnel performing the repair. The repair time is the total 
time needed to return an item in a failed state back to its last known good condition (i.e., meeting 
the specification), including both the time needed to determine the root cause after a failure and 
the time to renew the product; repair time is the transition between the failure state and the repair 
state (Attar, Raissi, & Khalili-Damghani, 2017). The repair time distribution is often shown using 
the lognormal distribution due to the large amount of small repair times and small amount of 
large repair times (NASA, 2015). The repair time can be estimated in multiple ways such as 
empirical data, industry repair guides, and expert opinion. 
4.2.1.1 Empirical Data 
Empirical data can come from the test and operation repair times of the product being evaluated 
or from the repair data of a similar product in the same industry. This data can be gathered from a 
company’s quality system or build records. Finding the repair times in the quality system, 
however, can take a long time. Better record keeping makes finding the information easier. For a 
particular failure mode, the individual repair times can be collected over a time period to find the 
MTTR. MTTR is also called the expected repair time and is found by taking the mean of the 
individual repair times for a given failure (Birolini, 2014). The MTTR for a lognormal 
distribution is found using  
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Equation 4-1 while the lognormal variance is found using Equation 4-2. 
 
Equation 4-1. Lognormal MTTR (from NASA (2015). 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 =  𝜇 =  𝑒
(𝑡′+
𝑠′
2
2 )
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡 ′̅ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 (𝑀𝐿𝐸)𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  
𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠′
2
 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝐿𝐸 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒.  
 
Equation 4-2. Lognormal repair time standard deviation (from NASA (2015). 
𝜎 = 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 √𝑒𝑠′
2
− 1 
 
Equation 4-3. MLE repair time mean (from NASA (2015)). 
𝑡 ′̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑡𝑖
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𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑖
′ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠. 
 
Equation 4-4. MLE repair time variance (from NASA (2015)). 
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For example, during the assembly of an electric vehicle, an automated robot places the battery 
pack in the chassis. Over the past 3 months, the robot has failed 10 times, with the time (in hours) 
to repair each failure as 3.9, 11.7, 5.7, 4.2, 9.3, 4.5, 5.1, 7.1, 5.3, and 5.7. The MLE repair time 
mean is found using Equation 4-3; the lognormal values are found in Table 4-1. The result is a 
MLE repair time mean of 1.77. 
 
Table 4-1. Lognormal Repair Times 
Repair time (ti) Lognormal repair time (ti’) 
3.9 1.36 
4.2 1.44 
4.5 1.50 
5.1 1.63 
5.3 1.67 
5.4 1.69 
5.7 1.74 
7.1 1.96 
9.3 2.23 
11.7 2.46 
 
The MLE repair time variance is found using Equation 4-4 and results in a value of 0.1235. The 
MTTR for the lognormal distribution of the battery installation robot is found using Equation 4-1 
with a standard deviation found using Equation 4-2: 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 =  𝑒(1.77+
0.1235
2 ) = 6.23 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 
𝜎 = 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 √𝑒𝑠′
2
− 1 = 6.23√𝑒0.1235 − 1 = 2.26 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 
 
4.2.1.2 Industry Repair Guides 
Different industries have their own repair guides that list common failures and estimated repair 
times for products in operation. The repair guides can come from the manufacturer or 
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independent agencies for a given product. They can take the form of manuals, software, or online 
databases. Repair guides are widely used in the automotive industry and have existed as early as 
the 1920s (Cortada, 2017). Today, most automotive vehicle manufacturers provide repair times 
for common failures to their authorized service centers and dealerships. Independent automotive 
repair facilities may use the manufacturer repair guides or a repair guide authored by an 
independent agency. A few of the more common sources for independent repair guides are 
Chiltons®, Mitchell 1®, and ALLDATA®. Guide authors find the estimated repair time by using 
subject matter experts (SME) and materials such as field data, time studies, and vehicle 
manufacturer data to determine how long an average mechanic requires to make a repair given 
average tools, average equipment, and an average vehicle (Hixson, 2013). These repair guides are 
available through a subscription service where new car models and repair times are constantly 
being added and updated. 
Repair guides are also commonly used for warranty work. The original manufacturer is often 
associated with authorized repair centers that end users can contact to perform warranty work on 
the product. The warranty period is a given amount of time or use during which a manufacturer 
guarantees failure-free performance and pays to repair a product that has a failure during that 
period. Manufacturers typically provide estimated or maximum repair times to a repair center for 
normal repairs. The maximum time allowed is the time for which the manufacturer reimburses 
the repair center for performing the warranty work. For example, Delfield® is a company that 
manufactures refrigeration units and servings stations for the restaurant industry. Their standard 
labor guideline lists the amount of time to repair or replace certain components on their products, 
as shown in Table 4-2. 
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Table 4-2. Warranty Repair Time Guidelines 
Standard Labor Guidelines to Repair or Replace Parts for Delfield® Products 
Labor up to 1-hour to replace 
- Infinite switch 
- Door jamb switch 
- Solenoid switch 
- Hi-limit/thermal protector switch 
- Fan delay/defrost termination switch 
- Compressor start components 
- Defrost timer 
- Thermometer 
- Gear motor 
- Contactor/relay 
- Transformer 
- Evaporator/condenser fan motor 
- Circulating fan motor and blade 
- Digital control 
- Water level sensor 
- Door hinges and locks 
- Condensate element 
- Springs/lowerator 
Labor up to 2-hour to replace 
- Thermostat 
- Drawer tracks 
- Pressure control 
- Solenoid valve 
- Defrost element 
- Heating element 
- Locate/repair leak 
Labor up to 3-hour to replace 
- EPR or CPR valve 
- Expansion valve 
- Condenser or evaporator coil 
- Cap tube 
Labor up to 4-hour to replace 
- Compressor  
Note. Adapted from Johnson (2013). 
 
4.2.1.3 Expert Opinion 
Early in a product’s life cycle, detailed failure cost information is not often available. Repair 
times can be estimated by SMEs on the FMEA team. The team can choose multiple ways to 
estimate a repair time, from point estimates to Monte Carlo simulation. When using a point 
estimate, a team may determine a most likely repair time or give a minimum and maximum range 
value for the repair time. One disadvantage of using a SME opinion is subjectivity; and can be 
addressed by a Monte Carlo simulation along with the SME repair times to calculate an MTTR 
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and standard deviation. With limited empirical information and SME-estimated repair times, the 
triangular distribution provides a basis for performing a Monte Carlo simulation (Rhee, 2005). A 
triangular distribution has three variables: minimum, most likely, and maximum repair times. For 
example, the repair time of a composite wing on an aircraft can take a minimum of 4 hours and a 
maximum of 16 hours with a most likely time of 8 hours. To estimate the MTTR and standard 
deviation of the repair time for the composite wing, a Monte Carlo simulation is used. There are 
multiple commercially available software programs that can randomly generate values based on a 
probability density function. For this study, I use JMP® statistical software. A Monte Carlo 
simulation is beneficial because it allows users to run multiple random number generations for 
estimation purposes. The triangular distribution of (4, 8, and 16) with 10,000 replicates produces 
the distribution shown in Figure 4-1, with a lognormal curve fitted over the plot. Fitting the 
lognormal curve creates a quick visual aid to determine if the values for the triangular distribution 
are close to a lognormal curve as repair times are typically lognormal (NASA, 2015). The 
lognormal curve is not expected to fit the triangular distribution perfectly, but the triangular 
distribution should be adjusted if the values are skewed to the right or left. According to Equation 
4-1 and Equation 4-2, the MTTR and the standard deviation for the composite wing repair is 9.35 
hours and 2.61 hours, respectively. 
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Figure 4-1. Histogram plot for composite wing repair times. 
 
4.3 Probability of Failure 
Reliability is the probability that a product meets its specification over a period of time or 
demand; risk is the probability that a product does not meet its intended specification (Birolini, 
2014). Reliability is also known as the probability of success while risk is also known as the 
probability of failure. Reliability is shown mathematically by Equation 4-5. 
 
Equation 4-5. Reliability equation. 
1 = 𝑅(𝑡) + 𝐹(𝑡) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑅(𝑡) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹(𝑡) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘.  
 
The probability of failure and the failure rate must be defined to understand how each is used in 
reliability engineering. The probability of failure and the failure rate are not the same and should 
not be used interchangeably. One way to measure the probability of failure is to measure on a 
demand base using results from a binominal distribution where each test is independent and 
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results in a pass or fail (Quigley & Revie, 2011). For example, a battery in a car is used to start 
the car. The battery is considered successful if the car starts and is considered a failure if the car 
does not start. The formula for the probability of failure is shown in Equation 3-1.  
The failure rate is typically a time-based measure of an item using a Weibull or exponential 
distribution where an item failure count is measured over a run time (Adams, 2017). For example, 
a clock is used to measure time. The total run time of the clock is measured before the clock can 
no longer accurately measure the time. The failure rate is denoted by the Greek letter lambda (λ), 
and the formula for failure rate is shown in Equation 4-6. 
 
Equation 4-6. Failure rate (from Adams (2017). 
𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝜆 =
𝑛(𝑓)
𝑇
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛(𝑓) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒. 
 
In reliability engineering, a large sample population with independent and statistically identical 
items experiences a failure rate over a time curve that appears u-shaped, which is often called a 
bathtub curve. In the bathtub curve, the initial life has a decreasing failure rate, the middle portion 
has a constant failure rate, and the end of life experiences an increasing failure rate (Birolini, 
2014).  
 
 93 
 
 
Figure 4-2. Bathtub reliability curve. Adapted from Rhee (2005). 
 
The initial life is also known as the infant mortality, where failures are due to random failures in 
components and processes (Birolini, 2014). During the transition to production, the product is 
refined, and processes become mature through development cycles, component burn-in, and 
incoming inspections. The failure rate is constant through the useful life of the product and is the 
longest time period of the life cycle. By the end of the life cycle, the failure rate begins to 
increase due to fatigue and worn-out components. The bathtub curve can be modeled by the 
failure rate for the Weibull distribution. Table 4-3 shows the relation between the Weibull shape 
parameter and the slope of the failure rate over time. 
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Table 4-3. Weibull Failure Rate Versus Shape Parameter 
Shape parameter Failure rate Life cycle 
0 < β < 1 Decreasing Infant 
β = 1 Constant Useful life 
β > 1 Increasing Wear out 
Note. Adapted from Assis, Borges, and Vieira de Melo (2013). 
 
To find the probability of failure, the Weibull distribution is used (Equation 4-7).  
 
Equation 4-7. Weibull probability of failure. 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−(𝜆𝑡)
𝛽
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒, 𝛽 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟, 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒. 
 
When the shape parameter is equal to 1, the Weibull distribution is the same as the exponential 
distribution (Equation 4-8). 
 
Equation 4-8. Exponential probability of failure. 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−(𝜆𝑡) 
 
The probability of failure is commonly shown using the exponential distribution for 
simplification when small amounts of data are available, but this can lead to overestimating and 
underestimating of the failure rate (J. B. Bowles, 2002). Choosing the appropriate method to 
determine the failure rate is the user’s responsibility. 
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4.3.1 Empirical Data 
The empirical failure rate data can come from a product’s test and operational history or from a 
similar product history. This information can be gathered from a company’s quality system or 
build records.  
4.3.1.1 Data Center Example 
Backblaze is a cloud computing storage company that houses a data center with thousands of 
individual hard disk drives (HDD) and over 300 petabytes of storage capacity. Each day, 
Backblaze records the operating parameters of the individual HDDs in the data center and 
monitors for failures. Summarizing the daily records for 2016 by model type of HDD yields the 
following failure count and other metrics shown in Table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4. HDD Failures for 2016 
MFG Model 
HDD 
Size 
(TB) 
HDD 
Count 
Average 
Age 
(months) 
HDD 
days 
HDD 
failures 
HGST HUH728080ALE600 8 45 23 16,155 0 
Seagate ST8000DM002 8 8,660 5 1,075,720 48 
Seagate ST800NM0055 8 60 1 1,560 0 
Seagate ST6000DX000 6 1,889 21 684,840 16 
WDC WD60EFRX 6 446 24 166,152 25 
Toshiba MD04ABA500V 5 45 22 16,425 1 
HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 4 2,625 45 987,011 14 
HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 4 7,014 29 2,579,698 28 
HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 4 9,407 16 2,436,130 34 
Seagate ST4000DM000 4 34,738 22 12,359,750 938 
Seagate ST4000DX000 4 184 39 72,615 27 
Toshiba MD04ABA400V 4 146 21 52,983 0 
WDC WD40EFRX 4 75 17 16,790 1 
HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 3 4,476 56 1,647,137 34 
HGST HDS723030ALA640 3 978 61 361,937 22 
Toshiba DT01ACA300 3 46 44 16,900 2 
WDC WD30EFRX 3 1,105 30 390,379 35 
    Total 71,939   22,882,182 1,225 
Note. Adapted from (Klein, 2017a). 
 
From this data, the probability of failure can be estimated, and a failure rate per HDD model can 
be established. Using Equation 3-1, the probability of failure for each model can be found by 
dividing the HDD failure count by the HDD count for that model. The failure rate is found using 
Equation 4-6, where the HDD failure count is divided by the HDD days. This produces a failure 
rate per day for a given HDD. To find an annual failure rate, the per-day failure rate is multiplied 
by 365. Table 4-5 shows the results of the individual failure rates and the probability of failures. 
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Table 4-5. HDD Annual Failure Rate and Probability of Failure 
MFG Model 
HDD 
Count 
HDD 
days 
HDD 
failures 
λ 
(annual) 
pf 
HGST HUH728080ALE600 45 16,155 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Seagate ST8000DM002 8,660 1,075,720 48 0.0163 0.0055 
Seagate ST800NM0055 60 1,560 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Seagate ST6000DX000 1,889 684,840 16 0.0085 0.0085 
WDC WD60EFRX 446 166,152 25 0.0549 0.0561 
Toshiba MD04ABA500V 45 16,425 1 0.0222 0.0222 
HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 2,625 987,011 14 0.0052 0.0053 
HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 7,014 2,579,698 28 0.0040 0.0040 
HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 9,407 2,436,130 34 0.0051 0.0036 
Seagate ST4000DM000 34,738 12,359,750 938 0.0277 0.0270 
Seagate ST4000DX000 184 72,615 27 0.1357 0.1467 
Toshiba MD04ABA400V 146 52,983 0 0.0000 0.0000 
WDC WD40EFRX 75 16,790 1 0.0217 0.0133 
HGST HDS5C3030ALA 4,476 1,647,137 34 0.0075 0.0076 
HGST HDS723030ALA 978 361,937 22 0.0222 0.0225 
Toshiba DT01ACA300 46 16,900 2 0.0432 0.0435 
WDC WD30EFRX 1,105 390,379 35 0.0327 0.0317 
      Total 0.0195 0.0170 
Note. Adapted from (Klein, 2017a). 
 
In order to convert the annual failure rate to a probability of failure, the failure rate is assumed to 
be constant, and Equation 4-8 is used to find the probability of failure for t=1 (1 year) for a failure 
rate of 0.0195, which gives the following result: 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−(𝜆𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−(0.0195∗1) = 0.0193  
The differences in the probability of failure can be attributed to the assumption of a constant 
failure rate. In the average age of the HDD in Table 4-4, there is a range in age which could be 
masking an increased failure rate during the infant or wear-out period of a HDD. When choosing 
a probability of failure for the EI-FMEA, the user decides which value is more appropriate to use. 
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If the failure rate is used, it should be normalized to an annual failure rate by using either 
Equation 4-7 or Equation 4-8 with a time period of 1.   
4.3.2 Component Manufacturer Data 
 A manufacturer can report reliability data for a product by giving a mean time to failure (MTTF). 
The MTTF is the expected time a product will run before a failure event occurs, assuming a 
constant failure rate while being non-repairable. The MTTF can be found by dividing the total run 
time of a number of products and by the number of failures (Equation 4-9). Using Equation 4-9, 
the MTTF is the reciprocal of the failure rate (Equation 4-6).  
 
Equation 4-9. Mean time to failure. 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
𝑇
𝑁𝑇
=
1
𝜆
 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝑇  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 
 𝑏𝑦 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑇. 
 
When a company wants to report a MTTF for their product, they often perform a case study on a 
sample set of a product. For example, an internet service provider wants to determine the MTTF 
for their cable modem. They take a sample set of 50 modems and run them continuously for 60 
days (1440 hours). During the test duration, 1 modem fails. Using Equation 4-9, the company 
reports the MTTF for the modem as 72,000 hours or 8.22 years. 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹 =
1440 ℎ𝑟 ∗ 50 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑠
1
= 72,000 ℎ𝑟 
To determine the probability of failure using the manufacturer’s MTTF value, Equation 4-8 needs 
to be modified resulting in Equation 4-10.  
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Equation 4-10. Exponential probability of failure with MTTF. 
𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑒−(
𝑡
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹) 
 
The probability of failure for the cable modem is shown for the product life in Table 4-6. 
 
Table 4-6. Modem Probability of Failure 
Run time 
(years) 
p(f) 
1 0.11 
2 0.22 
3 0.31 
4 0.39 
5 0.46 
6 0.52 
7 0.57 
8 0.62 
9 0.67 
10 0.70 
 
4.3.3 Industry Reliability Standards 
Industry reliability guides and standards are issued by companies, government agencies, and 
independent organizations to help individuals estimate reliability through the identification of 
physical and environmental factors exerted on a product. A list of the major reliability standards 
is shown in Table 4-7. 
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Table 4-7. Major Reliability Estimation Guides and Standards 
Standard Year Product Type 
FIDES Guide 2009-A 2010 Electronics 
MIL-HDBK-217F 1995 Electronics 
NSWC-11 2011 Mechanical Equipment 
Telcordia SR-322, Issue 4 2016 Telecommunication 
 
 
The FIDES methodology was created in response to the lack of updates on MIL-HDBK-217F and 
can be used in all industries using electronics including, for example, aerospace, military, 
automotive, railway, space, telecommunications, and household electronics (FIDES, 2010). The 
FIDES consortium is comprised of commercial and military partners. In the guide, the general 
reliability model is based on the failure rate where the failure rate is the summation of physical 
contributions multiplied by the product of process contributions (Equation 4-11). 
 
Equation 4-11. FIDES general failure rate model (from FIDES (2010)) 
𝜆𝑖 = ∑𝜆𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 ∗ Π𝑃𝑀 ∗ Π𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜆𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, Π𝑃𝑀  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Π𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡. 
 
The estimated failure rates are represented in FIT, where 1 FIT is equal to 1 failure per billion 
hours (FIDES, 2010).  
MIL-HDBK-217 estimates failure rates based on part stress analysis and includes factors for 
electronic components such as semiconductors, lasers, tubes, resistors, capacitors, inductive 
devices, relays, fuses, conductors, and switches (United States Department of Defense, 1991). 
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The part failure rate model consists of the base part failure rate multiplied by the π factors which 
modify the base failure rate for environmental conditions and other parameters that affect the 
reliability of the part (United States Department of Defense, 1991). 
 
Equation 4-12. MIL-HDBK-217 failure rate (from United States Department of Defense (1991)). 
𝜆𝑝 = 𝜆𝑏 ∗ 𝜋𝑇 ∗ 𝜋𝐴 ∗ 𝜋𝑅 ∗ 𝜋𝑆 ∗ 𝜋𝐶 ∗ 𝜋𝑄 ∗ 𝜋𝐸 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜆𝑏 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝜋𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝜋𝐴 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝜋𝑅 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 𝜋𝑆 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟, 
πC is the contact construction factor, πQ is the quality factor, and  πE is the  
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟. 
 
The Naval Surface Warfare Center, looking to expand reliability estimation beyond electronic 
components, created a reliability estimation method for mechanical equipment. The method uses 
a similar approach to MIL-HDBK-217 by estimating failure rates based on the product of a base 
failure rate and the environmental, stress, and operating factors. The Naval Surface Warfare 
Center 11 (NSWC-11) handbook includes estimation methods for seals, gaskets, springs, 
solenoids, valve assemblies, bearings, pumps, compressors, electronic motors, brakes, clutches, 
and other mechanical equipment. 
The different estimation techniques in the various industry standards and guides help estimate a 
constant failure rate for a product, which can be used with Equation 4-6 to determine the 
product’s probability of failure. 
4.3.4 Expert Opinion 
Early in the product’s life cycle, a mature design is not available. A part list or bill of materials 
may not be fully developed, nor may a suitable similar empirical database be available. During 
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this time, the engineers and other SMEs may be required to use engineering judgment for 
potential failure rates of a product. The SMEs may choose to estimate a probability of failure 
(e.g., 1 in 50,000 cycles) or estimate the MTTF (e.g., 50,000 hours). When estimating a MTTF, 
either a point estimate or Monte Carlo simulation may be used, similar to the method shown in 
Section 4.2.1.3 where the MTTF is an exponential distribution. To convert the MTTF to a failure 
rate and find the probability of failure, a constant failure rate must be assumed. 
Another appropriate method is based on low- or zero-failure-rate empirical data. In a study 
comparing multiple methods for estimating the probability of failure when the empirical data has 
zero failures, Bailey (1997) identifies an appropriate equation that provides the probability of 
failure based on the number of trials preformed with zero failures.  
 
Equation 4-13. Zero failure estimator (from Bailey (1997)). 
𝑃 = 1 − 1.5
1
𝑛 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑃 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠  
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑜 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠. 
 
Equation 4-13 can be used by the SME for determining the probability of failure for a given 
period of trials or for a given time period.  
4.4 Variability in Failure Cost and Probability of Failure 
Variability in the failure cost calculation can come from the repair time and the probability of 
failure estimation methods. A way to incorporate the variability into the calculation can be done 
using empirical data or Monte Carlo simulation.  
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4.4.1 Empirical Data 
Failure data is collected for a theoretical power supply during a built-in-test that records the 
ability of the power supply to perform after being subjected to a series of temperature cycles. The 
number of failures is recorded along with the amount of time it takes to repair and retest the unit 
to pass the test and is shown in Table 4-8.  
 
Table 4-8. Power Supply Failures 
Failure 
Number 
Repair 
Time 
(hr) 
Failure 
Number 
Repair 
Time 
(hr) 
1 5.46 11 4.11 
2 5.10 12 5.52 
3 4.21 13 5.87 
4 5.74 14 6.70 
5 4.86 15 5.37 
6 4.30 16 3.68 
7 4.39 17 5.32 
8 6.57 18 5.44 
9 4.56 19 4.38 
10 5.67 20 3.93 
 
There are 500 power supplies tested with 20 failures recorded. Calculating the expected failure 
cost for the power supply with a quantity of 500, a labor rate of $160/hr, repair component cost of 
$200, and a failure rate of 0.04 (i.e., 20/500) yields 20 different failure costs for the power supply 
failure. Calculating the 1st and 3rd quartiles shows the interquartile range that encompasses the 
middle half of the failure cost which is $17,811 - $22,031. Visually, this can be expressed using a 
box and whisker plot where the box is the 1st and 3rd interquartile range and the whiskers show 
the top and bottom failure cost (Figure 4-3). The interquartile range is one way to bound the EFC 
variability due to repair time from the power supply test.  
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Figure 4-3. Power supply EFC box plot 
 
4.4.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
The variability when estimating a failure cost can be included through the use of a Monte Carlo 
simulation. Variability can come from probability of failure and the repair time for a given failure 
mode. A theoretical radar system has an acceptance test to test the alignment of the antenna. If the 
alignment fails, the radar test technician performs an alignment procedure that can vary in the 
time to perform with a triangular distribution of 2, 3, or 6 hours. A radar system has a normal 
probability of failure distribution of 0.01 with standard deviation of 0.000001 and a repair time 
triangular distribution of 2, 3, and 6 hours. A Monte Carlo simulation is performed to generate 
1,000 random values for the probability of failure and the repair time. Calculating the EFC using 
the 1,000 replicates for probability of failure and the repair time, a quantity of 10,000 radar 
systems, and a labor rate of $160/hr gives a range of potential EFC. The 1st and 3rd quartiles 
provides the interquartile range $47,805 - $67,885 for the estimated EFC. Visually this is shown 
using a box and whisker plot to include the top and bottom EFC values shown in Figure 4-4 and 
can be used to account for variability by bounding the EFC compared to a single point estimate.  
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Figure 4-4. Radar system Monte Carlo EFC box plot 
 
The EI-FMEA team determines which method is more appropriate for the given application when 
expressing EFC as a single point estimate or using a range that can be bounded by the 1st and 3rd 
quartiles. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a variety of estimation methods are introduced for determining the failure cost and 
the probability of failure, which can be used during the EI-FMEA process. No single estimation 
method addresses all situations that may be encountered. A combination of the methods is most 
often needed during an EI-FMEA. When to use each method is decided by the EI-FMEA team, 
but there are times when certain methods increase the accuracy of the results. Empirical test data 
can provide actual repair times and reliability estimates, but they may not be available in the early 
life cycle of a product. During product development and early production, the use of industry 
repair guides, component manufacturer data, and industry reliability standards can fill these gaps 
while an empirical test database is collected. At product inception, when a product has a limited 
component list or bill of materials, using SMEs to provide inputs can be invaluable. While SME 
opinion is the least accurate of the methods described, it may be the only option at the time; 
however, using the Monte Carlo simulation to generate random data can help with the 
subjectivity that can come from varying expert opinions. An FMEA team can choose to use point 
estimates or a range of failure costs by including the variability of the inputs used in the quartile 
examples.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
FMEA METHOD COMPARISON 
5. FMEA Method Comparison 
In this chapter, I perform three different FMEAs on the same product and compare the risk 
prioritization for the individual failure modes. The three methods being compared are traditional 
FMEA, Lifecycle Cost Based FMEA, and Economic Impact FMEA. The product being 
evaluated, which I refer to as Product X, is a ceramic matrix composite (CMC) product used in 
the aerospace industry. The chapter first introduces the three methods and describes Product X. 
Then, I perform the individual FMEAs, prioritize the risks, and present the top risks for each 
method. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the three FMEA methods’ ability to 
prioritize risk. 
5.1 FMEA Methods 
The three FMEA methods prioritize risk differently. In traditional FMEA, the RPN is found by 
taking the product of the SOD variables and the risk is ranked by aligning the RPN in descending 
order. The FMEA team then addresses the failure modes with the highest RPN values. In LCB-
FMEA, the risk prioritization comes from ranking the EFC in descending order. The EFC is the 
product of the probability of failure, the cost of failure occurring, and the number of parts affected 
by the failure mode. The decision to implement a corrective action is based on cost effectiveness. 
The EI-FMEA method uses the EIV to prioritize risk. The EIV is ranked in ascending order, 
where higher-ranked values indicate higher savings in relation to the adjusted failure cost. 
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5.2 Product X 
Product X is a CMC product used in the aerospace industry as an access cover that creates a seal 
on an airframe. The product is made of a CMC cover bonded into an exterior frame. The frame is 
used for mounting and to provide a seal surface on an airframe. It also has a structural component 
due to a variable internal pressure and must meet an internal burst pressure requirement. It is a 
relatively new product and is currently transitioning from development to production. The 
development build rate was approximately 30 units per year while the full production build rate is 
approximately 150 units per year. The expected production life cycle of the product is 10 years. 
During development, failures were recorded over a 3-year period. This database is stored in the 
manufacturer’s operating system and can be used to gather information for the FMEA process. 
There are 30 unique process steps in the build flow (Figure 5-1). 
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Figure 5-1. Product X process flow worksheet. 
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5.3 Comparison of FMEA Methods 
In the following sections, I perform an FMEA on Product X using traditional FMEA, LCB-
FMEA, and EI-FMEA. The purpose of performing the FMEA on Product X is to improve the 
product’s quality by identifying and ranking risk while prioritizing failure modes and corrective 
actions to reduce the expected failure cost. The failure modes identified by each of the risk 
prioritization methods are shown along with the ability of each method to reduce failure cost.  
5.3.1 Traditional FMEA Results 
To begin the traditional FMEA process, which I will refer to as FMEA, the FMEA team creates a 
list of failure modes. There are 63 potential individual failures from Product X identified by 
reviewing the quality records and brainstorming potential failure scenarios. Next, the team 
chooses SOD variable scales which are shown in Table 5-1, Table 5-2, and Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-1. FMEA Severity Factors 
Severity of effect 
Severity 
ranking 
Product, end user, or plant safety at risk; risk of noncompliance to 
government regulations 
10 
Major impact on ability to produce quality product on time; includes 
significant interference with subsequent steps or damage to equipment; could 
result in mission failure 
9 
Product defect, rejection, failure in in-spec storage/operational environments; 
disruption to subsequent process steps 
7–8 
End-user dissatisfaction, some degradation in performance, loss of margin, or 
delays in the process 
4–6 
Slight end-user annoyance, slight deterioration in performance or margin, 
minor rework action, or in-line delays 
2–3 
Little to no effect on product or subsequent steps 1 
Note. Adapted from Childs et al. (2012). 
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Table 5-2. FMEA Occurrence Factors 
Occurrence 
defect rate 
Occurrence 
ranking 
1 in 2 10 
1 in 8 9 
1 in 20 8 
1 in 40 7 
1 in 80 6 
1 in 400 5 
1 in 1,000 4 
1 in 4,000 3 
1 in 20,000 2 
1 in 1,000,000 1 
 
 
Table 5-3. FMEA Detection Factors 
Likelihood of detection 
Detection 
ranking 
No means of detection; no process or equipment to find problem in 
time to affect outcome 
10 
Controls would probably not detect defect; operator to perform self-
inspection 
9 
Controls have poor chance of detecting defect; inspection alone to 
detect problem 
7–8 
Controls might detect defect; double inspection or inspection with 
equipment aids 
5–6 
Controls have good chance of detecting defect; process equipment 
detects presence of problem under most circumstances 
3–4 
Controls will almost certainly detect defect; process detects defects 
automatically 
1–2 
Note. Adapted from Childs et al. (2012). 
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For the individual failure modes, the SOD variables are chosen from the given tables, and the 
RPN is calculated for each failure mode. When performing an FMEA, the FMEA team chooses 
the level at which to address a particular failure mode. For Product X, that value is any RPN 
equal to or greater than 100. Of the 63 failure modes, there are 31 unique RPN values—29 above 
100 and 34 below 100 (Figure 5-2). 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Product X RPN. 
 
The top failure modes (Figure 5-3) are due to cracks occurring in Product X during 
manufacturing and operation. The higher RPN values occur during operation, where the 
likelihood of detection decreases significantly from the manufacturing cycle. In-process tests 
during manufacturing increases the likelihood of detection; cracks that develop in Product X in 
operation have a minimal chance of being discovered prior to a failure event. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 100 200 300
F
re
q
u
en
cy
RPN
Product X - RPN
 112 
 
 
Figure 5-3. FMEA top 5 failure effects. 
 
Failure modes are listed by item numbers 1 through 63 and Figure 5-4 shows their risk rank, 
where 1 is the highest risk, found by the RPN decision metric. 
 
 
Figure 5-4. FMEA failure mode item number versus risk rank. 
 
5.3.2 Lifecycle Cost Based FMEA Results 
The LCB-FMEA uses the same set of failure modes and effects from the traditional FMEA 
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quantity, repair time, labor rate, and probability of failure need to be calculated. The 
manufacturer’s quality system provides the failure rates, failure types, repair times, and other 
build information needed for the LCB-FMEA. A combination of empirical data, industry 
reliability standards, and SME input provides the input variables for the LCB-FMEA. Product 
X’s total development build quantity over 3 years is 91 units with 57 individual failure events 
recorded. The probability of failure for a recorded failure event is found using Equation 3-1. For 
example, Product X has a requirement to sustain an internal pressure value with a maximum leak 
rate of y. A failure occurs when the leak rate of y is not met. Failing the leak test can occur when 
the interior surface of Product X is not thoroughly cleaned prior to the application of interior 
paint. Leak rate failure is the most common failure occurrence during the development life cycle, 
with 20 recorded instances. Therefore, the probability of failure is 20/91=0.2198. 
There are multiple failure modes that have not occurred in Product X’s development cycle and 
are not part of the industry reliability standards. To estimate probability of these failures, 
Equation 4-13, along with the life cycle of Product X and SMEs, is used. Product X’s production 
rate is 150 units per year, with a life cycle of 10 years. The probability of failure is estimated on a 
yearly basis (Figure 5-5). The SME can then use the probability of failure for a given time period 
in the LCB-FMEA. 
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Figure 5-5. Product X’s estimated probability of failure. 
 
Failure modes are listed by item numbers 1 through 63 and Figure 5-6 shows their risk rank, 
where 1 is the highest risk, is based on the EFC decision metric. For the LCB-FMEA method, 
there is a total EFC of $6,334,854.54 for Product X over its 10-year life cycle. 
 
 
Figure 5-6. LCB-FMEA failure mode item number versus risk rank. 
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5.3.3 Economic Impact FMEA Results 
EI-FMEA’s methodology is similar to LCB-FMEA’s. The two methods diverge in the risk 
prioritization of failure modes. This divergence happens after the EFC for the individual failure 
modes is calculated. The second portion of the EI-FMEA involves brainstorming corrective 
actions along with implementation cost, new probability of failure, new repair cost, new 
component cost, and new repair component cost. This is where the FMEA team determines the 
economic impact of implementing a corrective action on a failure mode and prioritizes based on 
the largest economic impact (i.e., cost savings). The EI-FMEA is unique in that it only ranks 
failure modes when implementing a corrective action results in a cost savings. If the AFC is the 
same or greater than the EFC, the rank is no change (NC).  
For Product X, there are 37 instances out of 63 potential opportunities where the corrective action 
results in a cost savings. Figure 5-7 shows the risk rank, where 1 is the highest risk, found by the 
EIV decision metric. The EIV decision metric only ranks risks where a corrective action is cost 
effective to implement. The gaps in the number line show the item numbers that are cost intensive 
and do not have a rank using the EIV decision metric. For the EI-FMEA method, there is a total 
CFC of $2,206,361.31 for Product X, which is a cost savings from the EFC of $4,073,222.28 
(i.e., 65.2%) over the 10-year life cycle. 
 
 
Figure 5-7. EI-FMEA failure mode item number versus risk rank. 
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5.4 FMEA Method Evaluation 
Each of the three FMEA methods have unique risk prioritization metrics. Table A-1 summarizes 
all 63 failure modes, failure effects, root causes, RPN, RPN rank, EFC, EFC rank, EIV, and EIV 
rank. The three FMEA methods report differing risks for similar failure modes. The RPN results 
in 31 unique numbers, EFC results in 43 unique numbers, and EIV results in 58 unique numbers. 
Table 5-4 shows the top 10 failure mode item numbers found by each method. 
 
Table 5-4. Risk Rank by Method 
Risk 
Rank 
Item Number 
RPN EFC EIV 
1 48 31 32 
2 47 32 31 
3 49 21 21 
4 53 42 42 
5 31 43 3 
6 55 18 18 
7 58 44 20 
8 42 20 44 
9 40 41 43 
10 62 19 41 
 
Comparing the RPN risk prioritization to the EIV risk prioritization (Figure 5-8), the methods 
rank risk in differing ways. The top three risks found using the RPN are not even ranked for 
change based on the EIV method. Looking at the failure modes, the high ratings from the RPN 
metric come from failures that occur during operation with limited detection methods. These 
 117 
 
same failures are shown as no change in the EIV risk prioritization method due to the low 
probability of failure paired with a cost-intensive corrective action. 
 
 
Figure 5-8. RPN versus EIV risk rankings by failure mode item number. 
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item number 3 would not be addressed and a savings of $275,449 would not be realized. 
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The EFC risk prioritization metric and the EIV risk prioritization metric also produce differing 
results (Figure 5-9). The EIV rank is calculated after measuring the impact of implementing a 
corrective action. This allows the ranks to change based on larger potential savings through cost-
reduction efforts that are not present during the ranking of the EFC. The EFC rank also needs to 
be evaluated further to determine if the corrective action is cost effective. A cost intensive 
corrective action can create gaps in the EFC risk rank scale where certain values are eliminated. 
 
 
Figure 5-9. EFC versus EIV risk rankings by failure mode item number. 
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For further comparison, each failure mode item number uses the economic impact value and is 
ordered based on its risk rank and corrective action implementation criteria from each FMEA 
method. LCB-FMEA and EI-FMEA can combine multiple outcomes to create a failure scenario 
where a failure scenario is the sum of individual failure effects given a single root cause. Figure 
5-10 shows the cumulative cost savings through the implementation of corrective actions for RPN 
and EIV. There is a significant cost delta between the RPN and EIV risk prioritization metrics. 
The EIV method results in a total savings of $4,201,706.52 while the RPN method results in a 
total savings of $2,888,733.95 for a cost delta of $1,312,972.57 between the methods. There are 
29 failure modes addressed by the RPN and 27 failure scenarios by the EIV.  
 
 
Figure 5-10. RPN versus EIV cumulative savings. 
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implemented from each method, the EI-FMEA results in a savings of $1,137,425.16 while the 
LCB-FMEA results in a savings of $695,419.87. The savings delta between EI-FMEA and LCB-
FMEA is between $260,000 and $360,000 from risk ranks 5 to 18. The savings delta can become 
significant when there are finite resources for corrective actions and only a certain number of 
corrective actions (e.g., the top 10 risk ranks) can be implemented. 
 
 
Figure 5-11. EFC versus EIV cumulative savings. 
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Both LCB-FMEA and EI-FMEA use cost effectiveness as the criteria for implementing a 
corrective action. Where LCB-FMEA ranks risk based on potential cost savings (i.e., EFC), EI-
FMEA ranks risk based on estimated cost savings (i.e., EIV). The difference is EI-FMEA 
incorporates the implementation cost and effect into the rankings where LCB-FMEA does not. 
While both methods result in the same overall savings, EI-FMEA’s risk prioritization can save 
more money when there are finite resources for implementing corrective actions. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR EI-FMEA 
6. Practical Applications for EI-FMEA 
In this chapter, I discuss the practical applications of the EI-FMEA method, beginning with a 
theoretical example for a desktop computer. I evaluate the design of the computer to select the 
HDD and options that would lower the manufacturer’s cost. Next, I perform a case study using 
Product X from Chapter V and examine the highest priority failure modes, based on the EI-
FMEA risk prioritization metric, to implement corrective actions. I then determine the probability 
of failure over a number of units to compare the estimated probability of failure with the actual 
probability of failure. The chapter concludes with a summary of the practical uses of EI-FMEA. 
6.1 Design EI-FMEA 
Using the EI-FMEA method at an earlier stage results in larger potential benefits. During the 
initial product design, EI-FMEA can be used to select initial components, establish fabrication 
processes, determine product reliability, and check product conformance to a specification. The 
design phase accounts for the majority of the life cycle cost; by the end of the design phase, 75% 
of the life cycle cost has been committed to the product while only 15% of the actual life cycle 
cost has been spent (SAE International, 1992). Choosing the right components for a product early 
in the design phase is critical. 
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6.2 Computer System Example 
A computer company, Lily Pad Computers (LPC), wants to design a new computer system called 
the LPC 712. The goal of the design is to have a computer system with multiple storage options 
for users. LPC’s users typically use the computer for home cloud networks and expect the 
computer to have a large storage capacity for multimedia files. The computer system (Figure 6-1) 
includes a keyboard, mouse, monitor, speaker system, and a tower that houses the HDD that 
determines the system’s storage capacity. 
 
 
Figure 6-1. LPC computer block diagram. 
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LPC’s system engineer has been tasked with selecting for the LPC 712 models a HDD with a 3 
terabyte (TB) HDD, 4 TB HDD, and 8 TB HDD. There are four main manufacturers with 
multiple models of HDDs. The manufacturers are HGST, Seagate, Toshiba, and Western Digital 
Corporation (WDC). Once again, I use HDD data collected by Backblaze over a 4-year period to 
select the HDDs for the LPC 712-3, LPC 712-4, and LPC 712-8. The drive failure numbers 
shown in Table 6-1 have been recorded for varying models of HDD and storage capacity since 
2013. 
 
Table 6-1. HDD Failure Data from April 2013 Through March 2017 
Item Manufacturer Model 
Drive 
size 
(TB) 
Drive 
count 
Drive days 
Drive 
failures 
1 HGST HUH728080ALE600 8 45 34,828 2 
2 Seagate ST8000DM002 8 8,660 1,891,214 71 
3 Seagate ST8000NM0055 8 60 39,119 2 
4 HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 4 75 271,674 4 
5 HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 4 9,362 5,224,341 93 
6 HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 4 7,085 6,714,263 114 
7 Toshiba MD04ABA400V 4 146 101,523 4 
8 WDC WD40EFRX 4 46 50,640 3 
9 Seagate ST4000DM000 4 34,737 25,915,163 2,077 
10 HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 3 4,595 6,317,882 144 
11 HGST HDS723030ALA640 3 1,027 1,397,042 73 
12 Toshiba DT01ACA300 3 58 68,426 7 
13 Seagate ST33000651AS 3 293 222,147 26 
14 WDC WD30EFRX 3 1,102 1,124,720 165 
15 WDC WD30EZRX 3 388 123,577 25 
16 Seagate ST3000DM001 3 4,247 2,205,148 1,614 
   Total 71,926 51,701,707 4,424 
Note. Adapted from (Klein, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
The baseline HDD can be chosen by selecting the HDD with the lowest EFC based on the drive 
size. To calculate the EFC, the probability of failure is found for each HDD by first finding the 
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failure rate using Equation 4-6 and then converting the failure rate to the probability of failure for 
1 year using Equation 4-8. The failure probabilities for each HDD are shown in Table 6-2. 
 
Table 6-2. HDD Probability of Failure 
Item Manufacturer Model 
Drive 
size (TB) 
λ 
(annual) 
Probability 
of failure 
(1 year) 
1 HGST HUH728080ALE600 8 0.0210 0.0207 
2 Seagate ST8000DM002 8 0.0137 0.0136 
3 Seagate ST8000NM0055 8 0.0187 0.0185 
4 HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 4 0.0054 0.0054 
5 HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 4 0.0065 0.0065 
6 HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 4 0.0062 0.0062 
7 Toshiba MD04ABA400V 4 0.0144 0.0143 
8 WDC WD40EFRX 4 0.0216 0.0214 
9 Seagate ST4000DM000 4 0.0293 0.0288 
10 HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 3 0.0083 0.0083 
11 HGST HDS723030ALA640 3 0.0191 0.0189 
12 Toshiba DT01ACA300 3 0.0373 0.0367 
13 Seagate ST33000651AS 3 0.0427 0.0418 
14 WDC WD30EFRX 3 0.0535 0.0521 
15 WDC WD30EZRX 3 0.0738 0.0712 
16 Seagate ST3000DM001 3 0.2672 0.2344 
 
Next, the system engineer calculates the EFC for each HDD. The HDDs all experience the same 
potential failure modes and repair times, so, for simplicity, the system engineer calculates the cost 
to repair/replace a failed HDD. LPC has a standard warranty period of 1 year and a yearly 
production quantity of 500,000 for each model; therefore, the EFC is calculated for a single year 
of production. From Equation 3-8, the EFC is found:  
𝐸𝐹𝐶 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝐷𝐷 1 =  𝐶𝑖 ∗ 𝑝𝑖 ∗ 𝑞𝑗 = 269.99 ∗ .0207 ∗ (500,000 ∗ 1) = $2,800,067.62 
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The baseline HDDs are chosen for the LPC 712-3, LPC 712-4, and LPC 712-8 based on the 
lowest EFC, which is shown in Table 6-3.  
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Table 6-3. EFC of HDD by Size 
Item Manufacturer Model 
Cost of 
drive ($) 
Drive 
size 
(TB) 
Annual 
quantity 
Probability 
of failure 
(1 year) 
Expected 
failure cost 
($) 
EFC Rank 
(by drive 
size) 
1 HGST HUH728080ALE600 269.99 8 500,000 0.0207 2,800,067.62 3 
2 Seagate ST8000DM002 259.00 8 500,000 0.0136 1,762,414.96 1 
3 Seagate ST8000NM0055 264.99 8 500,000 0.0185 2,449,563.60 2 
4 HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 126.92 4 500,000 0.0054 340,124.88 1 
5 HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 113.99 4 500,000 0.0065 369,122.83 2 
6 HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 119.95 4 500,000 0.0062 370,531.05 3 
7 Toshiba MD04ABA400V 129.99 4 500,000 0.0143 928,002.86 4 
8 WDC WD40EFRX 134.20 4 500,000 0.0214 1,435,343.94 5 
9 Seagate ST4000DM000 107.94 4 500,000 0.0288 1,555,933.52 6 
10 HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 87.00 3 500,000 0.0083 360,385.95 1 
11 HGST HDS723030ALA640 67.99 3 500,000 0.0189 642,223.75 2 
12 Toshiba DT01ACA300 82.46 3 500,000 0.0367 1,511,124.07 3 
13 Seagate ST33000651AS 84.99 3 500,000 0.0418 1,777,134.11 4 
14 WDC WD30EFRX 109.95 3 500,000 0.0521 2,866,302.37 5 
15 WDC WD30EZRX 123.76 3 500,000 0.0712 4,404,634.82 6 
16 Seagate ST3000DM001 73.98 3 500,000 0.2344 8,672,061.61 7 
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The baseline HDDs are summarized in Table 6-4. 
 
Table 6-4. LPC 712 Baseline HDD 
Manufacturer Model 
Drive 
size 
(TB) 
Expected failure 
cost ($) 
EFC Rank by 
drive size 
Seagate ST8000DM002 8 1,762,414.96 1 
HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 4 340,124.88 1 
HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 3 360,385.95 1 
 
The cost of each computer model (LPC 712-3, LPC 712-4, and LPC 712-8) is the same based on 
HDD size regardless of the cost of the HDD. LPC requires the HDD to have a probability of 
failure no greater than 0.10 after a 5-year period. The next step is to calculate the AFC and EIV 
for each HDD model in comparison to the baseline HDD. This allows for the cost of the HDD 
and 5-year probability of failure requirement to be evaluated to minimize the failure cost for the 
LPC 712 computer system. The probability of failure in 5 years is found by using the annual 
failure rate of each model in Equation 4-8. Two of the 4-TB HDDs and five of the 3-TB HDDs 
are eliminated (see Table 6-5) because their 5-year probability of failure exceeds 0.10. 
 
 129 
 
Table 6-5. HDD Probability of Failure in 5 Years 
Item Manufacturer Model 
Drive 
size 
(TB) 
λ 
(annual) 
Probability 
of failure 
(5 year) 
1 Seagate ST8000DM002 8 0.0137 0.0662 
2 Seagate ST8000NM0055 8 0.0187 0.0891 
3 HGST HUH728080ALE600 8 0.0210 0.0995 
4 Seagate ST4000DM000 4 0.0293 0.1361 
5 HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 4 0.0065 0.0320 
6 HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 4 0.0062 0.0305 
7 HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 4 0.0054 0.0265 
8 Toshiba MD04ABA400V 4 0.0144 0.0694 
9 WDC WD40EFRX 4 0.0216 0.1025 
10 HGST HDS723030ALA640 3 0.0191 0.0910 
11 Seagate ST3000DM001 3 0.2672 0.7370 
12 Toshiba DT01ACA300 3 0.0373 0.1703 
13 Seagate ST33000651AS 3 0.0427 0.1923 
14 HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 3 0.0083 0.0407 
15 WDC WD30EFRX 3 0.0535 0.2349 
16 WDC WD30EZRX 3 0.0738 0.3087 
 
The baseline HDDs for each computer model (Table 6-4) become the initial failure input in the 
EI-FMEA method. The corrective action becomes replacing the baseline HDD with another HDD 
option per the drive size. The AFC (Equation 3-10), EIV (Equation 3-11), and EIV rank are 
calculated to determine which HDD should be selected for each LPC 712 model. For the LPC 
712-8, the baseline HDD (Seagate ST8000DM002) results in the best option. For the LPC 712-4, 
two HDD options show more cost savings than the baseline HDD (HGST HDS5C4040ALE630). 
The HDD with the highest EIV rank is the HGST HMS5C4040BLE640, which gives a cost 
savings of $6,436,002.05. For the LPC 712-3, the HDD with the highest EIV rank is the HGST 
HDS723030ALA640 with a cost savings of $9,223,162.20 over the baseline HDD (HGST 
HDS5C3030ALA630). The total savings from using the EI-FMEA method during the LPC 712 
design is $15,659,164.25. 
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Table 6-6. EI-FMEA LPC 712 HDD Rank 
It
em
 
M
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
re
r 
M
o
d
el
 
C
o
st
 o
f 
d
ri
v
e 
($
) 
E
F
C
 R
a
n
k
 
R
ec
u
rr
in
g
 
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
co
st
 (
$
) 
A
d
ju
st
ed
 f
a
il
u
re
 
co
st
 (
$
) 
E
IV
 (
$
) 
E
IV
 R
a
n
k
 
C
o
rr
ec
te
d
 f
a
il
u
re
 
co
st
 (
$
) 
S
a
v
in
g
s 
($
) 
1 Seagate ST8000DM002 259.00 1 0.00 1,762,414.96 0.00 NC 1,762,414.96 0.00 
2 Seagate ST8000NM0055 264.99 2 5.99 5,444,563.60 3,682,148.64 NC 1,762,414.96 0.00 
3 HGST HUH728080ALE600 269.99 3 10.99 8,295,067.62 6,532,652.66 NC 1,762,414.96 0.00 
5 HGST HMS5C4040BLE640 113.99 2 (12.93) (6,095,877.17) (6,436,002.05) 1 (6,095,877.17) (6,436,002.05) 
6 HGST HMS5C4040ALE640 119.95 3 (6.97) (3,114,468.95) (3,454,593.83) 2 (3,114,468.95) (3,454,593.83) 
7 HGST HDS5C4040ALE630 126.92 1 0.00 340,124.88 0.00 NC 340,124.88 0.00 
8 Toshiba MD04ABA400V 129.99 4 3.07 2,463,002.86 2,122,877.98 NC 340,124.88 0.00 
10 HGST HDS723030ALA640 67.99 2 (19.01) (8,862,776.25) (9,223,162.20) 1 (8,862,776.25) (9,223,162.20) 
14 HGST HDS5C3030ALA630 87.00 1 0.00 360,385.95 0.00 NC 360,385.95 0.00 
         Total (15,659,164.25) 
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The EI-FMEA allows users to compare the initial cost of the HDD in the ranking calculation. 
Since the cost of the computer system is the same regardless of the cost of the HDD, there is a 
cost savings in selecting a cheaper HDD with a higher probability of failure for both the LPC 
712-3 and LPC 712-4 models. For the LPC 712-8, the lowest-cost HDD also has the lowest 
probability of failure. The higher probability of failure is acceptable to LPC based on the 0.10 
probability of failure requirement over 5 years. Using the EI-FMEA method results in significant 
savings to LPC compared to using the EFC rank as a design metric. 
6.3 Product X Case Study 
In Chapter V, Product X is introduced as a CMC cover used in the aerospace industry. I perform 
an EI-FMEA on Product X to help identify failure modes and rank potential corrective actions as 
Product X transitioned to production. A case study is being performed on Product X using the 
results of the EI-FMEA found in section 5.3.3 to measure the impact of the EI-FMEA method on 
Product X. The EIV risk prioritization metric has identified 27 corrective actions that should be 
implemented to reduce the failure cost of Product X at an implementation cost of ~$174,000. 
6.3.1 Corrective Action Implementation 
Due to finite resources, not all of the corrective actions can be implemented simultaneously. The 
first barrier is the overall cost to implement. To implement a corrective action, management 
approval is needed to allocate the necessary funds. The second complication is a resource 
bottleneck where multiple items require the same resource, such as a tooling design engineer, for 
implementation. For Product X, management approval is given to pursue the top three risks based 
on EIV value (shown in Table 6-7). The estimated time to implement the top three items is 2 
months, during which time Product X production will be on hold. 
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Table 6-7. Product X Top Risks Ranked by EI 
Item/Function 
Potential 
Failure 
Mode 
Potential Root 
Cause of 
Failure 
Potential 
Effects of 
Failure 
Improvement 
Plan / 
Corrective 
Action 
Cost to 
Implement 
($) 
EIV ($) Rank 
Cover assembly can 
hold pressure value 
at maximum 
required leak rate 
X does not 
meet 
maximum 
leak rate 
Robot sprayed 
uneven interior 
coating 
Fails leak test 
– scrap 
New robot 18,160.00 (1,137,425.16) 1 
Cover assembly can 
hold pressure value 
at maximum 
required leak rate 
X does not 
meet 
maximum 
leak rate 
Interior surface 
not clean prior 
to application of 
interior paint 
Fails leak test 
– scrap 
Addition of 
ultrasonic 
clean 
procedure 
13,616.00 (695,419.87) 2 
Cover assembly can 
hold pressure value 
at maximum 
required leak rate 
X does not 
hold burst 
pressure 
Large internal 
stress in 
assembly 
Fails burst 
pressure test – 
scrap 
Match frame 
to CMC cover 
based on 
thermal 
expansion 
50,800.00 (662,607.26) 3 
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6.3.2 Results and Conclusions 
During the 2-month hold on production, the new cleaning procedure was the first corrective 
action to be implemented. It involved finding an outside supplier with expertise in ultrasonic 
cleaning. The cleaning parameters were developed with the cleaning supplier and the process 
engineer for Product X. The new paint coating machine was also purchased and brought online. A 
study was carried out to reduce stress in the assembly by matching the CMC cover to the frame 
based on the coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) of each component. A system was 
developed for measuring the CTE of the frame to determine which CMC cover should be used in 
the bonded assembly. Four initial units went through the CTE matching, new cleaning procedure, 
and new coating machine. The first two parts passed the leak rate requirement but failed during 
the burst pressure test requirement. The next two parts were given the burst test prior to the 
cleaning procedure and the new coating machine. There was a concern that the ultrasonic 
cleaning method could be damaging the part. One of the parts passed the burst pressure test, but 
the second part failed. The part that passed the burst pressure test went through the clean 
procedure and new coating machine and passed the leak rate requirement. This led the 
engineering team to determine the CTE matching method was not reducing the internal stress of 
the assembly, so an in-depth investigation was performed. 
 
Table 6-8. Development Test Results 
Serial 
number 
Ultrasonic 
clean 
New coat 
machine 
CTE 
match 
method 
Leak 
rate 
test 
Burst 
pressure 
test 
4001 Yes Yes Yes Pass Fail 
4002 Yes Yes Yes Pass Fail 
4003 Yes Yes Yes Pass Pass 
4004 No  No  Yes N/A Fail 
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The failure investigation on the burst pressure test for Product X resulted in a significant effort to 
determine the root cause of the failures. The cure cycle was found to be the underlying root cause 
for the burst pressure test failures. A new cure cycle was developed and tested on two units to 
their ultimate pressure load to determine the pressure load margin. The test to ultimate load was 
required for implementing the new cure profile. The implementation cost also increased due to 
the investigation. Table 6-9 compares the actual implementation costs against the estimated 
implementation cost for each of the three failure modes. 
 
Table 6-9. Actual and Estimated Implementation Costs 
Item EFC ($) 
Estimated 
implementation 
cost ($) 
Actual 
implementation 
cost ($) 
Estimated 
EIV ($) 
Updated EIV 
($) 
1 1,232,307.43 18,160.00 28,264.00 (1,137,425.16) (1,127,321.16) 
2 2,365,384.62 13,616.00 8,160.00 (695,419.87) (700,875.87) 
3 739,285.71 50,800.00 214,000.00 (662,607.26) (499,407.26) 
 
Since the implementation of the new cure profile, ultrasonic cleaning procedure, and new coating 
machine, there have been 42 assemblies of Product X with no failures. The expected failure cost 
using the probability of failure before the corrective action implementation and after the 
corrective action implementation for the 42 assemblies is shown in Table 6-10. EI-FMEA method 
provides the economic impact over the life cycle of a product. As the product matures, updating 
the failure cost based on the build data helps to make comparisons to the estimated probability of 
failure and repair times. The EI-FMEA is a living method and should be performed anytime there 
is a major change to the system.  
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Table 6-10. Failure Cost Analysis 
Item Quantity 
Pf 
before 
CA 
Pf after 
CA 
Failure 
cost ($) 
Estimated 
failure cost 
before CA 
($) 
Estimated 
failure cost 
after CA 
($) 
Actual 
failure cost 
after CA 
($) 
1 42 0.1099 0.00667 7,175 33,118 2,010 0 
2 42 0.2198 0.00154 7,175 66,237 4,664 4,200 
3 42 0.0659 0.00231 7,475 20,689 725 0 
 
The probability of manufacturing 42 passing parts in a row can be found by taking the original 
probability of success (i.e., 1 - probability of failure) to the 42nd power, assuming the failures are 
independent. Table 6-11 shows the probability of 42 parts passing in a row both before the CA 
was implemented and after the CA was implemented. 
 
Table 6-11. Probability of Success for 42 Parts in a Row 
Item 
Probability of 
failure before 
CA 
Probability 
of failure 
after CA 
Probability 
of 42 pass 
before CA 
Probability 
of 42 pass 
after CA 
1 0.1099 0.00667 0.0075 0.7551 
2 0.2198 0.00154 0.00003 0.9374 
3 0.0659 0.00231 0.0570 0.9075 
 
 
6.4 Summary 
The computer design example and Product X case study show two practical applications for the 
EI-FMEA. As discussed in section 2.2.2, FMEA is used in a wide variety of industries for a wide 
variety of practical applications. The addition of the costing element and EIV risk prioritization 
metric used in the EI-FMEA method allows for new product designs to be based on minimizing 
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the expected failure cost. The case study on Product X shows that EI-FMEA is a living method; 
reviewing and updating the results helps the product to become more mature.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discuss a summary of the research, recommendations for future work, and this 
study’s contributions to the body of knowledge.   
7.1 Summary of the Research 
7.1.1 Problem Overview 
In today’s marketplace, companies face competition on a global scale. To be competitive, a 
company needs a high-quality part, low product-development times, and low failure costs 
(Carlson, 2012). Dependability analysis techniques are available to companies to help meet these 
demands. One dependability analysis technique widely used in manufacturing is FMEA, but there 
are multiple documented limitations to the FMEA method including ambiguity of the risk 
prioritization metric (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). FMEA uses the RPN as a risk prioritization metric 
and for the allocation of finite resources for corrective action. The ambiguity of the RPN risk 
prioritization metric in FMEA, however, produces inconsistent risk prioritization (L.-Y. Chen & 
Yeh, 2014; Gargama & Chaturvedi, 2011; Kmenta & Ishii, 2005). The cost associated to improve 
the system quality (i.e., allow the system to meet a specification) can be between 20%–50% of 
sales, thus reducing a company’s ability to be competitive in the marketplace (Dahlgaard & 
Dahlgaard, 2002; Gupta & Campbell, 1995; Sandoval-Chávez & Beruvides, 1998). Any new risk 
prioritization method needs to have a decision-support system to determine when to implement
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a corrective action or improvement (H.-C. Liu et al., 2016). 
7.1.2 Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to develop an economic-impact-based failure mode and effects 
analysis that uses an economic-risk prioritization metric to prioritize risk and determine resource 
allocation in a manufacturing environment. Through this research, the following questions are 
answered: 
1. How can risk be prioritized to reduce failure cost? 
2. How are finite resources allocated to reduce failure cost? 
7.1.3 Methodology Review 
The first part of the research is the development of the economic-impact-based failure mode and 
effects analysis method. The method is derived from the current body of knowledge. The research 
community has named the ambiguity of the RPN and SOD variables as a major limitation to the 
traditional FMEA method (H.-C. Liu et al., 2013). Replacing the RPN and SOD variables in the 
traditional FMEA method addresses the limitation. The first reference to a cost-based risk 
evaluation criteria comes from Gilchrist (1993). He proposed replacing the SOD variables with a 
new set of variables including the probability of a failure occurring, the probability the customer 
receives the product, the cost of a failure event, and the quantity of products built. The product of 
the variables, which makes up the risk prioritization, is known as the failure cost. The method is 
further developed by Kmenta (2001), who includes failure scenarios and updates the variables to 
create the TEC, and Rhee (2005) who creates a detailed failure cost calculation and life cycle cost 
variable.  
The EI-FMEA method uses cost-based methods as the foundation while creating a new set of 
variables for the risk prioritization and decision-support system. Continued analysis beyond the 
initial failure is one of the strengths of traditional FMEA that has not been implemented in 
 139 
 
previous cost-based methods. The resulting decision-support system uses the EIV risk 
prioritization metric to determine if a corrective action should be implemented after ranking risks 
by the largest reduction in failure cost. This allows for the user to base corrective action 
implementation on the potential economic value added over the life cycle of the program and 
provides a way to make decisions when there are finite resources. 
This research validates the EI-FMEA method through the evaluation of multiple FMEA methods, 
the theoretical design of a new product, and a case study. An aerospace product, Product X, 
which is currently being transitioned from development to production, is used to evaluate three 
FMEA methods and their ability to rank risk while reducing failure cost. The three methods 
include traditional FMEA, which uses the RPN risk prioritization metric; LCB-FMEA, which 
uses the EFC risk prioritization metric; and EI-FMEA, which uses the EIV risk prioritization 
metric. A set of 63 individual failure modes are identified for Product X. Then, the risk 
prioritization metrics for each of the three FMEA methods are used to determine corrective action 
implementation. The results of the FMEA methods are shown based on the expected failure cost 
reduction through decision-support criteria using the risk prioritization metric. 
The design for a theoretical product, the LPC 712 computer system, uses the EI-FMEA method to 
compare design alternatives and to find ways to reduce failure rates and overall cost through 
component selection. For the LPC 712 example, I use a failure database, collected by Backblaze 
for HDD on their cloud storage center, for selecting HDD options for the LPC 712 based on 
storage size. The initial HDD for each model is chosen based on EFC and then compared to the 
reliability requirements. Finally, I use the EI-FMEA decision-support system for selecting the 
HDD with the lowest estimated failure cost over the LPC 712 life cycle.  
The final validation uses a case study on Product X where the top three failures identified during 
the FMEA evaluation by the EI-FMEA method are implemented and the results presented. 
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7.1.4 Major Findings 
7.1.4.1 FMEA Evaluation 
Each of the three FMEA methods has differing results when ranking the failure modes. The 
decision-support system for traditional FMEA is determined by the FMEA team, so I choose any 
RPN over 100 as the criteria to implement a corrective action. For LCB-FMEA, the decision-
support system is not well defined and only recommends implementing a corrective action if the 
action is economically sustainable. LCB-FMEA does not include the decision-support criteria in 
the risk prioritization ranking, which leads to confusion in the risk rank. A high-value risk rank 
may not lead to a corrective action being implemented due to high implementation cost. The EI-
FMEA method incorporates the decision-support criteria into the risk prioritization metric. Like 
the LCB-FMEA method, only corrective actions that are economically sustainable are 
implemented in EI-FMEA, but, unlike the LCB-FMEA method, the EIV risk prioritization rank 
has already incorporated this value. Figure 7-1 shows the cumulative failure cost reduction for 
each FMEA method when only looking at the risk prioritization rank. Both traditional FMEA and 
EI-FMEA can use their decision-support criteria along with the risk rank for corrective action 
implementation. For LCB-FMEA, decision-support criteria cannot be determined based on the 
EFC or risk rank, making it difficult to know which corrective actions should be implemented. 
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Figure 7-1. Cumulative failure cost reduction versus risk rank. 
 
Another finding during the FMEA evaluation is the relationship between similar RPN values and 
EIV as well as between similar EFC values and EIV. For example, in Table 5-5, a failure mode 
with RPN value of 64 could have a difference in EIV of approximately $789,000. Likewise, 
Table 5-6 shows failure modes with similar EFC values having a difference in EIV of 
approximately $277,000. 
7.1.4.2 EI-FMEA Product Design 
The LPC 712 computer system’s design uses the EI-FMEA method to compare design decisions 
in relation to the HDD to use for the different computer system models. The baseline HDD is 
chosen using the EFC, which selects the HDD based on the highest reliability. The EI-FMEA 
allows for a comparison of design alternatives to the baseline HDD, taking into account the 
HDD’s system reliability requirements and initial cost. In Table 6-6 the full outcome of the 
design alternative using the EI-FMEA results in a failure cost reduction of over $15.6 million. 
The EI-FMEA method allows the comparison of design alternatives that can sacrifice some 
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performance for a cost savings while still meeting requirements. Including the recurring cost 
calculation in the EI-FMEA method makes this possible. 
7.1.4.3 Product X Case Study 
The case study on Product X shows how the EI-FMEA method can be used when there are finite 
resources. For this case study, only the top three failure modes identified by the EIV 
recommended implementing corrective action. This is due to a limit on funds available to 
implement corrective actions. During the implementation of the corrective actions in the case 
study, one of the corrective actions increases the probability of failure, and the product line is shut 
down for an extended time for a failure investigation until implementing a new corrective action. 
With the new corrective action implemented and the product line back in production, 42 units are 
fabricated and tested with no failures. Table 6-11 shows a low probability of the success of the 
passing parts due to chance alone. 
7.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
7.2.1 External Failure Cost 
The EI-FMEA focuses on visible external failure cost over non-visible external failure cost. The 
incorporation of the external failure cost can be used for calculating visible external failure cost, 
but does not have a detailed procedure for establishing non-visible external failure cost. As I 
discussed in section 2.1.2, external failure cost is difficult to estimate as the true cost of a 
defective product reaching the customer may not be known for years. A detailed external failure 
cost should include both visible (e.g., warranty claims, product returns, product repair times) and 
non-visible (e.g., loss of customers, reduced perceived quality) costs. A detailed external failure 
cost calculation can help to improve the EI-FMEA by taking into account the non-visible failure 
cost and impact of a defective product reaching the customer. 
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7.2.2 Best Method for Reducing Failure Cost 
In chapter V, EI-FMEA was compared to traditional FMEA and LCB-FMEA. The results show 
each method ranking risk in a different way that results in differing failure cost reductions. 
Further research could evaluate the three methods based on the largest failure cost reduction over 
multiple studies to determine if one of the methods consistently produces the lowest failure cost. 
This would contribute to the body of knowledge by showing which method is the best way to 
reduce failure cost through preventative and corrective action. 
7.2.3 Time to Perform 
The time to perform an FMEA has been listed as a limitation to the method by multiple 
researchers (Bluvband & Grabov, 2009; Carmignani, 2009; Goble, 2012; Kmenta, 2001; Price & 
Taylor, 2002). The EI-FMEA method has more steps and calculations than traditional FMEA and 
LCB-FMEA. One of the limitations of EI-FMEA discovered during the research is the time 
needed to complete a product evaluation. Future research could focus on reducing the amount of 
time needed to make an input and look to reduce or streamline the amount of manual calculations. 
Making the EI-FMEA less time consuming would contribute to the body of knowledge by 
addressing the time to perform limitation. 
7.3 Contributions to the Body of Knowledge 
There are multiple gaps in the literature with respect to FMEA. The EI-FMEA addresses the 
ambiguity of the SOD variables and RPN risk prioritization decision metric of traditional FMEA 
by replacing them with the probability of failure, the failure cost, and the EIV risk prioritization 
decision metric. This research also allows for the comparison of one study to another study and 
for a quantifiable measure of improvement by using cost as the decision metric. 
Current cost-based FMEA methods and their respective risk prioritization decision metrics do not 
define an economic factor for corrective action implementation. The EIV risk prioritization 
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metric has a decision-support system to determine when to implement a corrective action and to 
rank only improvements that are economically sustainable; H.-C. Liu et al. (2016) list these 
abilities as requirements for a new risk prioritization method. 
7.4 Final Remarks 
The EI-FMEA is a new dependability analysis that is created to determine failure modes, 
calculate failure cost, calculate corrective action implementation cost, and rank risk based on the 
largest potential reduction in failure cost. Having this tool allows companies to create high-
quality parts, lower product development times, and reduce failure costs to be competitive in a 
global environment. 
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